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As information and communications technologies (ICT) become increasingly
pervasive, vehicles are expected [Blau08] to be equipped in the near fu-
ture with intelligent devices and radio interfaces, known as on-board units
(OBUs). OBUs are allowed to talk to other OBUs and the road-side infras-
tructure formed by road-side units (RSUs). The OBUs and RSUs, equipped
with on-board sensory, processing, and wireless communication modules,
form a self-organized vehicular network, commonly referred to as vehicu-
lar ad hoc network (VANET), a commercial instantiation of mobile ad hoc
networks with vehicles as the mobile nodes.
VANET systems aim at providing a platform for various applications that
can improve traffic safety and efficiency, driver assistance, transportation
regulation, infotainment, etc. There is substantial research and industrial
effort to develop this market. Vehicular communications are supported by
the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) standard [DSRC] in
the USA and the Car 2 Car Communication Consortium [Car2car] in Eu-
rope. Microsoft Corp.’s MSN TV [Msntv] and KVH Industries, Inc. [KVH]
have introduced an automotive vehicle Internet access system called Trac-
Net, which can bring Internet service to any in-car video screen. In Europe,
several projects such as SEVECOM [Secure] and NOW [NOW] are under
way. It is estimated that the market for vehicular communications will reach
v
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While the tremendous benefits expected from vehicular communications
and the huge number of vehicles are strong points of VANETs, their weakness
is vulnerability to attacks against security and privacy:
• In what regards security, attackers may exploit VANETs to send bogus
information to cheat other vehicles. For instance, selfish vehicles may
attempt to clear up the way ahead or mess up the way behind with
false traffic reports; criminals being chased may disseminate bogus no-
tifications to other vehicles in order to block police cars; terrorists may
produce serious traffic collisions with contradictory traffic announce-
ments. Such attacks may result in serious harm, even loss of lives.
• Regarding privacy, VANETs open a big window to observers. It is very
easy to collect information about the speed, status, trajectories and
whereabouts of the vehicles in a VANET. With this information, the
traffic administration authorities can optimize the traffic and relieve
jams. However, by exploiting this information, malicious observers
can draw inferences about a driver’s personality (e.g., someone driving
slowly is likely to be a calm person), living habits and social relation-
ships (visited places tell a lot about people’s lives). This private infor-
mation may be traded in underground markets, exposing the observed
vehicles and drivers to harass (e.g., junk advertisements), threats (e.g.,
blackmail if the driver often visits an embarrassing place, like a red-light
district) and dangers (e.g., hijacks).
Hence, both security and privacy should be taken into serious considera-
tion at the time of general deployment of VANETs. These issues seem similar
to those encountered in traditional communication networks, but there are
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distinctive features. The seriousness of security and privacy failures, the self-
organized nature of the network, the high mobility of vehicles, the relevance of
their geographic position, and the very sporadic connectivity between nodes
make the problem of achieving security and privacy in VANETs very novel
and challenging. Further, the motivation of administrations and carmakers
to deploy VANETs is precisely to decrease traffic congestion and accidents
rather than increasing them: hence, security (and probably privacy) is a con-
dition sine qua non for large-scale VANET deployment. This motivates the
work described in this thesis.
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With the fast advancement and pervasive deployment of information and
wireless communication technologies, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs)
are expected to develop in the near future. A VANET consists of on-board
units (OBUs) embedded in vehicles serving as mobile nodes and road-side
units (RSUs) working as the information infrastructure located in the critical
points of the road. OBUs and RSUs are equipped with built-in sensory, data
processing, and wireless communication modules. These modules allow vehi-
cles and road-side infrastructure units to communicate with each other over
single or multiple hops to exchange and share information about the routine
driving status reports of vehicles and the driving environment changes. With
these mechanisms, the OBUs and RSUs form a self-organized network which
is the first commercial version of mobile ad hoc networks.
VANETs have various potential applications. The main thrust behind
this type of networks are applications related to traffic safety. Tens of thou-
sands of people die and hundreds of thousands get injured in traffic accidents
1
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all over the world each year. Many traffic accidents come from the lack of
cooperation between drivers. By giving more information about possible
conflicts, most life-endangering accidents can be averted. VANETs also fa-
cilitate traffic optimization. Indeed, vehicles can collect data about traffic
jams, weather or road surface conditions, construction zones, highway or
rail intersections, emergency vehicle signal preemption, etc., and become in-
formation sources by sending those data to other vehicles in the VANET.
These mechanisms enable transportation administration authorities to guide
vehicles and manage them electronically (e.g., speed control, permits, etc.),
which is much more efficient than traditional manual administration. Fi-
nally, in addition to safety-related applications, value-added services can be
provided via VANETs. By implementing advanced electronic payment pro-
tocols in VANETs, one can expect to pass a toll collection station without
having to reduce speed, wait in line, look for some coins and so on. As GPS
systems have become available in many vehicles, it is also possible to real-
ize location-based services in VANETs, for instance, finding the closest fuel
station, restaurant, hotel, etc. Other kinds of services include infotainment,
vehicle-based electronic commerce and so on. All these services lead to a
more comfortable driving experience for drivers.
Having realized the great commercial opportunities of VANETs, many
academic and industrial organizations are committed to developing them.
In the USA, the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC, [DSRC])
standard is being developed to support wireless communications for vehi-
cles and road-side infrastructure. The Car2Car Communication Consortium
deals with vehicular communication standardization in Europe [Car2car].
With OBUs having a wireless connection to Internet, some infotainment can
be provided, e.g., Microsoft Corp.’s MSN TV [Msntv] and KVH Industries
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Inc. [KVH] have introduced an automotive vehicle Internet access system
named TracNet, which can bring Internet service to any in-car video screen.
It is predicted that the market of VANETs can be up to billions of Euros in
the near future.
For those new services to make life easier rather than more difficult, they
should rely on secure and privacy-preserving protocols that encourage users
to participate without fear for their safety or personal privacy [Samp05].
Consequently, security and privacy are two critical concerns for the designers
of VANETs that, if forgotten, might lead to the deployment of vulnerable
VANETs. Unless proper measures are taken, a number of attacks could eas-
ily be conducted, namely message content modification, identity theft, false
information generation and propagation, etc. The following are examples of
some specific attacks:
• If message integrity is not guaranteed, a malicious vehicle could modify
the content of a message sent by another vehicle to affect the behavior
of other vehicles. By doing so, the malicious vehicle could obtain many
benefits while keeping its identity unknown. Moreover, the vehicle
that originally generated the message would be made responsible for
the damage caused.
• If authentication is not provided, a malicious vehicle might impersonate
an emergency vehicle to surpass speed limits without being sanctioned.
• A malicious vehicle could report a false emergency situation to obtain
better driving conditions (e.g., deserted roads) and, if non-repudiation
is not supported, it could not be sanctioned even if discovered.
From the previous examples, it becomes apparent that message authenti-
cation, integrity, and non-repudiation are primary requirements in VANETs.
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There is a need for mechanisms that provide VANETs with security, i.e.,
protocols, methods and procedures that are able to: detect whether a mes-
sage has been modified by an attacker and determine who is the real sender
of a message.
Besides these essential security requirements, privacy is another impor-
tant issue in VANETs that cannot be forgotten. If the importance of privacy
protection measures is underestimated, the privacy of VANET users could
be endangered. For example, an eavesdropper could collect messages sent
by vehicles and track their locations; by doing so, he could infer sensitive
data of users such as their residence and their real identities [Karg95]. Note
that these privacy problems are similar to the ones of location-based services
(LBS, cf. [Sola08a, Sola08b] for further details). Nevertheless, privacy in
VANETs should be conditional, this is, user-related information such as li-
cense plate, current speed, current position, identification number, and the
like, should be kept private from other users/vehicles in the system while
authorized users (e.g., police officers) should have access to it.
1.2 Characteristics of VANETs
VANETs have a number of distinctive features with respect to generic mobile
ad hoc networks. Such features include the life-or-death importance of deci-
sions, the potentially disastrous consequences of security and privacy failures,
the high mobility of vehicles, etc. Due to these reasons, designing secure and
functional VANETs is a challenging problem.
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1.2 Characteristics of VANETs 5
1.2.1 Challenges
The life-or-death risk may be the most special feature of VANETs. In the
traditional networks or other emerging mobile networks, security and pri-
vacy failures usually bring only financial losses. However, both security and
privacy failures in VANETs could be much more serious. For instance, the
failure to detect a tampered vehicular message in time may cause serious
traffic accidents, with loss of lives. In case of privacy failures, a driver (e.g.,
a well-known millionaire or movie star) may become the victim of kidnappers
for ransom if organized criminals extract his/her driving routine by collecting
and analyzing vehicular communications. This implies that every effort must
be devoted to security and privacy concerns as a precondition for wide adop-
tion of VANETs. To achieve security, mechanisms are required to guarantee
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation of vehicular messages. At this
point, one realizes that solving the inherent conflict between authentication
and privacy poses a significant challenge.
Usually, to achieve security, vehicle-generated messages must be signed
so that the receiving vehicles can verify that these messages have been origi-
nated by authentic sources and have not been modified during transmission
[Goll02b]. However, with these signatures, it is possible for attackers to iden-
tify who generated a vehicular message containing speed, location, direction,
time and other driving information. A lot of private information on the
driver can be inferred if the driving pattern of his/her car can be tracked.
Furthermore, the signed vehicle-generated messages have to be stored by the
receiving vehicles for possible liability investigation: if some signed messages
are later found to be false and to have misguided other vehicles into acci-
dent, the message generators and endorsers should be traceable. However,
vehicular messages, especially their appended signatures, grow linearly with
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time while the storage capacity of OBUs in the vehicles is limited. Therefore,
security and privacy of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications need to be
conciliated with data aggregation/compression [Viej09, Wase09].
Network volatility is another factor that increases the difficulty of secur-
ing VANETs. Connectivity among vehicles can often be highly transient due
to their high speeds (e.g., think of two vehicles crossing each other in oppo-
site directions in a highway). This implies that protocols requiring multiple
rounds or strong cooperation such as voting mechanisms may be impractical.
Due to their high mobility, vehicles may never again connect with each other
after one occasional connection. This puts the public key infrastructure im-
plemented for securing VANETs under strain: if public-key certificates are
used, vehicles are confronted to a lot of certificates probably issued by sev-
eral different CAs; due to the mobility, there is little hope that caching the
verified certificates of vehicles and CAs will result in any significant speed-up
of the next verifications.
The size of VANETs deployed in metropolitan areas with millions of vehi-
cles is another challenge. Transportation systems are governed by a multitude
of authorities with different interests, which complicates things. A techni-
cally, and perhaps politically, convincing solution is a prerequisite for any
security architecture. Another challenge is the sheer scale of the network:
the system has to manage (tens of) millions of nodes of which some may join
or leave the VANET occasionally and some may be compromised. This rules
out protocols requiring massive distribution of data to all mobile nodes.
A final challenge comes from the time constraints of the envisioned safety
and driver-assistance applications. In case of emergency braking, milliseconds
of delay may cause a serious traffic accident. Hence emergency messages must
be generated by the sender and verified by the receiver as soon as possible.
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1.2 Characteristics of VANETs 7
In case of high vehicular density in metropolitan areas, each node may be
flooded by a large number of messages to be verified. Ideally, the safety-
related messages should be generated efficiently and given high verification
priority even if the receiver is flooded. Unfortunately, very few efforts have
been made so far to cater for these compelling concerns in practice.
1.2.2 Mitigating features
It follows from the above discussions that security in vehicular networks
faces a multitude of challenges. Nevertheless, we also observe that VANETs
possess special characteristics that can mitigate the above challenges and
enable high security and privacy standards.
Unlike in most mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), nodes in VANETs
can be expected to have substantial power supply and computational ca-
pacity. Cars have ample supply of power compared to battery-powered cell
phones or sensors. This implies that the communication protocols do not
need to be especially power-efficient. Compared with the price of a car, the
cost of computational capacity in OBUs is not an issue; in fact, an OBU
can be assumed to be as powerful as a personal computer. The protocols
can therefore exploit advanced cryptosystems to achieve high-end security
in VANETs, in opposition to other mobile networks where minimization of
cryptographic operations is necessary.
The security protocols in VANETs can also benefit from the existing
transportation systems. In most countries, all vehicles must be registered
at a central authority, which makes possible, for example, the assignment
of unique identities to vehicles. Traffic lights, traffic sensors, radars, etc.
have long been part of the infrastructure of current transportation systems.
They can be updated to become road-side units in VANETs. Also, vehicles
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undergo regular (annual) health inspections which permit sanity checks to
be run against the components of the vehicular networking system of each
car. The (tamper-proof) OBUs can be checked for integrity and updated to
the manufacturer’s latest version. Malfunctioning sensors that provide false
data (maybe because of tampering by an adversary) can be replaced. Also,
vehicles can leverage the additional input derived from the driver’s responses
with information provided by the networking subsystem. In many situations
a human driver can do a better assessment of a situation and reliably check
whether the information is correct or not, if the critical information is human-
recognizable.
Redundancy in vehicular communications can be a beneficial factor that
helps improving security and relieving the burden of message validation in
VANETs. A vehicle periodically receives large numbers of messages. How-
ever, some of them may be reporting the same traffic conditions; this can be
used to correct erroneous messages caused by occasional sensing errors or ma-
licious attacks. Further, only a fraction of the non-redundant messages need
validation. For example, a notification that the vehicle ahead will accelerate
does not affect the vehicle receiving the report. Similarly, a vehicle does not
need to validate a notification informing that the vehicle behind will brake.
By taking these factors into consideration, the message validation burden
can be greatly relieved without degrading security.
Finally, the existing law enforcement mechanisms are likely to be ex-
tended to cover malicious behavior in vehicular networks that compromises
the drivers’ safety. This can be a serious deterrent to attackers of VANETs.
Note that such law enforcement is not available in other forms of wireless ad
hoc networks. To exploit this deterrent, vehicular communications must of-
fer non-repudiation so that the message generator cannot deny the fact that
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he/she generated a message. In case of dispute, non-repudiable messages can
be taken as valid evidence in court.
1.3 Objectives
Security and privacy are two critical concerns for the designers of VANETs.
This Ph. D. thesis intends to:
• Design practical cryptographic schemes and develop novel methods for
securing vehicular communications.
• Design vehicular authenction schemes conciliating security, privacy and
performance in VANETs.
• Design secure value-added services (e.g., location-based service) in VANETs.
1.4 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 reviews the state of the art on security and privacy in VANETs.
Chapter 3 reviews mathematical and cryptographic background used by
our secure and privacy-preserving protocols: bilinear maps, complexity as-
sumptions and the batch verification lemma.
Chapter 4 deals with several efficiency and security challenges (i.e., cer-
tificate distribution and revocation, avoidance of computation and commu-
nication bottlenecks, and reduction of the strong reliance on tamper-proof
devices) by introducing a new group authentication protocol which is decen-
tralized in the sense that the group is maintained by each RSU rather than
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by a centralized authority as in most existing protocols employing group sig-
natures. In our proposal, we employ each road-side unit (RSU) to maintain
and manage an on-the-fly group within its communication range. Vehicles
entering the group can anonymously broadcast vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) mes-
sages, which can be instantly verified by the vehicles in the same group (and
neighbor groups). Later, if the message is found to be false, a third party can
be invoked to disclose the identity of the message originator. Our protocol
efficiently exploits the specific features of vehicular mobility, physical road
limitations and properly distributed RSUs. Our design leads to a robust
VANET since, if some RSUs occasionally collapse, only the vehicles driving
in those collapsed areas will be affected. Due to the numerous RSUs sharing
the load to maintain the system, performance does not significantly degrade
when more vehicles join the VANET; hence, the system is scalable.
Chapter 5 proposes a set of mechanisms that can actually conciliate traffic
safety, driver privacy and system efficiency. We employ identity-based group
signatures (IBGS) to divide a large-scale VANET into easy-to-manage groups
and establish liability in vehicular communications while preserving privacy.
Each party’s known identity, such as a vehicle license plate, is used as its
public key and no additional certificate is required. This efficiently avoids
the complicated certificate management of existing protocols. We further in-
vestigate emergency message generation and selfish verification techniques to
accelerate message processing in VANETs. Emergency message generation
allows vehicles to authenticate announcements with almost no delay. With
the selfish verification technique, a vehicle selects only the messages affect-
ing its driving decisions and validates the selected messages as if they were
a single one. These techniques effectively address the message processing
bottleneck in protocols for securing VANETs.
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1.4 Structure of this thesis 11
Cryptographic authentication techniques have been extensively exploited
to secure VANETs. Applying cryptographic authentication techniques such
as digital signatures raises challenges to efficiently store signatures on mes-
sages growing with time and to alleviate the conflict between traffic liability
investigation and limited storage capacity in vehicles. In Chapter 6, we effi-
ciently address those challenges by aggregating signatures in VANETs. With
our proposals, safety-related traffic messages can be significantly compressed
so that they can be stored for a long period for liability investigation. Fur-
thermore, our proposals allow a large number of traffic messages to be verified
as a single one, which greatly speeds up the response of vehicles to messages.
Analysis also shows that our proposals achieve high performance without
degrading security.
In Chapter 7, we propose a privacy-preserving LBS scheme in VANETs.
The proposed scheme employs identity-based cryptography and group sig-
natures as building blocks. In our proposal, no certificate is required to
guarantee the security of the system, which eliminates the certificate man-
agement overhead inherent to most existing systems. Our scheme achieves
strong privacy in the sense that an attacker (even an LBS provider) can-
not decide whether two different LBS requests were generated by the same
vehicle. However, if the message is later found to be false, a third party
can determine the identity of the vehicle. Analysis shows that cryptographic
operations in LBSs introduce only very slight overhead to the underlying
VANETs. Further, our scheme is robust in the sense that it does not rely on
proxies, the latter being too instable due to volatile connections in VANETs.
Chapter 8 contains concluding remarks and guidelines for future research.
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State of the Art
Due to the extraordinary commercial and social potential of VANETs, they
have attracted the attention of industry and academia. In Europe, the CAR
2 CAR Communication Consortium [Car2car] is leading the efforts to create
a European industry standard for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication
systems predicated upon wireless LAN components. In the US, the Intelli-
gent Transportation Systems Committee, sponsored by the IEEE Vehicular
Technology Society, has defined the standard for Wireless Access in Vehic-
ular Environments (WAVE, [WAVE]). WAVE is a radio communications
system intended to provide interoperable wireless networking services for
transportation. These services include those recognized for Dedicated Short-
Range Communications (DSRC) [DSRC] by the U.S. National Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) Architecture (NITSA) [National].
Security and privacy issues in VANETs have recently been studied by
many researchers. Various security and privacy challenges in vehicular net-
works are discussed in [Cala07, Daza09, Duri02, Gerl05, Goll10c, Huba04a,
Lee07, Parn05, Papa06, Papa07, Raya06, Raya05, Zark02]. In [Blum04],
Blum and Eskandarian propose a secure communications architecture based
13
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14 State of the Art
on a public key infrastructure (PKI) and a virtual network controlled by
cluster-heads intended to counter the so-called “intelligent collisions”, which
are collisions intentionally caused by malicious vehicles. This approach pro-
duces a remarkable overhead and the use of cluster-heads can create bottle-
necks. Gollan and Meinel [Goll02a] propose the use of digital signatures along
with GPS technology to identify cars securely, improve the fleet management,
and provide new applications for the private and the public sector. Consid-
ering the problem from a different point of view, Hubaux et al. [Huba04a]
emphasize the importance of privacy and secure positioning, and propose
the use of Electronic License Plates (ELP) to identify vehicles. Although
they recognize the importance of conditional privacy, they do not provide
any specific solution to the problem.
2.1 Secure and privacy-preserving protocols
for vehicular communications
To address the security and privacy challenges in safety-related applications
of VANETs, two techniques are generally used. The first one is based on
anonymous certificates and the second one is based on group signatures.
2.1.1 Technique based on anonymous certificates
In this line, a foundational proposal is given by Raya and Hubaux in [Raya07].
The authors use anonymous certificates (i.e., pseudonyms [Fons07]) to hide
the real identities of users1. Even though anonymous certificates do not con-
tain any publicly known relationship to the true identities of the key holders,
1Note that even when anonymous certificates are used, Trusted Authorities can trace
the real identity of users.
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2.1 Secure and privacy-preserving protocols for vehicular communications 15
privacy can still be invaded by logging the messages containing a given key
and tracking the sender until her identity is discovered (e.g., by associating
her with her residence)2. To avoid this attack, the way in which anonymous
certificates are used should be modified so that an observer cannot track the
owner of the keys. A natural way to do so, proposed in [Raya07], consists
in storing a number of anonymous certificates (as well as the corresponding
private/public key pairs) in a vehicle, so that the vehicle can use different
key pairs and avert traceability. However, depending on the key change fre-
quency, which can vary according to the current speed of the vehicle, vehicles
will have to store a large number of pairs. Thus, the secure distribution of
keys, key management, and storage become very complex; hence, this type
of scheme should be avoided for the sake of practicality.
In [Lu08], Lu et al. proposed an alternative way to overcome the limita-
tion of pre-storing a large number of anonymous certificates whilst preserving
conditional privacy. They assume that vehicles and RSUs are able to col-
laborate actively. Each vehicle issues a request for a short-time anonymous
certificate from an RSU when the vehicle is passing by the RSU, and obtains
an anonymous certificate after running a two-round protocol. Since a vehicle
should change the anonymous certificate quite often to avert linkability of
the messages, it should interact with RSUs frequently. Such a frequent inter-
action may affect the efficiency of the VANET. This short-lived anonymous
certificate needs to be sent and forwarded to verifiers for validating messages
from the anonymous originator. It is also worth mentioning the schemes in
[Freu07, Zhan08a], which also rely on RSUs. In [Freu07], the method of mix-
zones is used to enhance the anonymity of vehicles. However, this scheme
2This attack is possible due to the linkability “property” of the messages.
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16 State of the Art
still relies on pre-loading a large set of anonymous certificates in each vehi-
cle. In [Zhan08a], by exploiting a keyed hash message authentication code
(HMAC), a scheme with low communication overhead is proposed to secure
vehicle communications. This scheme requires a vehicle to obtain a symmet-
ric key from an RSU using a key agreement protocol. In order to protect
its privacy, the vehicle should use different public keys to communicate with
the RSUs. Hence, the vehicle still needs to pre-load a certain number of
anonymous certificates. As to robustness, the schemes in [Freu07, Zhan08a]
fully rely on RSUs. If an RSU collapses, then these schemes will not work
any more.
Recently, by using ID-based cryptography [Sham84] to avoid complicated
certificate management, Zhang et al. [Zhan08b] designed an efficient condi-
tional privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular communications. Their ap-
proach relies on tamper-proof devices embedded in the vehicles. The system’s
master key is stored in those tamper-proof devices so that pseudo-identities
(the function of which is similar to the use of anonymous certificates) can
be generated locally. Storing the system’s master key in each vehicle may
expose the system to powerful attackers and unpredictable risks even if the
storage devices are assumed to be tamper-proof. Those expensive tamper-
proof devices can prevent attackers from reading the secrets physically stored
in them. However, since the system’s master key will be involved in local
computations, the attacker has the chance to measure the energy (or time)
consumed by the computations, and the emitted electronic radiation, which
contains information about the secret. With this information and by means
of statistical methods, the attacker can launch powerful key extraction at-
tacks such as side channel attack [Koch96, Stan09], which are well-known in
cryptography. Although the side channel attack may be expensive to regular
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2.1 Secure and privacy-preserving protocols for vehicular communications 17
users, it is attractive and practical to organized criminals since, once the
master key is extracted, they have full control over the system.
2.1.2 Technique based on group signatures
Group signatures [Bone04b, Chau91, Grot07] are an alternative to achieve
security and privacy in VANETs. Group signatures have been investigated
for many years. In a group signature, there is a group manager (whose
role can be separated into two parts: issuer and opener) who maintains the
group; members may join or leave the group dynamically. After registering
to the group, the member can anonymously sign any message on behalf
of the group. A verifier can verify the group signature with only the group
public key but cannot know which registered vehicle is the message generator.
However, if necessary, the group manager can reveal the originator of any
group signature. The main merit of the group signature based technique
over the anonymous certificates approach is that the former overcomes the
limitation of pre-storing a large number of anonymous certificates.
Following this research line, Guo et al. [Guo07] presented a novel se-
curity framework for vehicular communications based on group signatures.
However, neither concrete instantiation nor experiment analysis are given in
[Guo07]. The first concrete instantiation of a group signature based tech-
nique in VANETs is due to Lin et al. [Lin07]. In [Lin07], they presented
GSIS, a conditional privacy-preserving vehicular communications protocol
based on group signatures, and ID-based signatures [Sham84]. In the GSIS
protocol, a single membership manager who issues secret member keys for
vehicles is used. Unfortunately, this approach cannot effectively cope with
the exclusion of compromised vehicles from the system. The solutions pro-
posed by Lin et al. [Lin07] to deal with compromised vehicles seem to be
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18 State of the Art
insufficient. The first option is to update the group public key pair for all
non-revoked vehicles. That entails a considerable overhead. The second op-
tion, called Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR), is similar to the traditional
certificate revocation list scheme. Since the signature verification time grows
linearly with the number of revoked vehicles, the VLR procedure becomes
very time-consuming and inefficient when the number of revoked vehicles
grows.
2.2 Signature aggregation in VANETs
We notice that the solutions proposed to secure VANETs face several un-
solved problems: i) how to store and process a large number of signatures in
the limited storage capacity of OBUs; ii) how to verify these signatures and
corresponding certificates in a short interval to enable effective response; iii)
how to compact and store cryptographic traffic evidence; iv) how to alleviate
the conflict between traffic liability investigation and data storage limitations
of vehicles.
Picconi et al. proposed a solution using PKI-based authentication scheme
[Picc06] for validating aggregated data. This scheme focuses on aggregating
messages, rather than aggregating signatures. Their main idea is to use ran-
dom checks to probabilistically catch the attacker, and thereby discourage
attacks in the network. Their solution assumes a tamper-proof service in each
car to carry out certain secure operations such as signing and time stamp-
ing. As noted by themselves, their solution suffers from some limitations.
Firstly, their solution can prevent modification of records and inclusion of
fake ones, but it cannot handle omission of records. Also, reaggregation is
not addressed. Another limitation of their solution is that it cannot provide
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2.3 Privacy-preserving LBS protocols 19
a generic method to validate semantically aggregated data. Finally, their so-
lution relies on the presence of a tamper-proof service in each car. While this
does not compromise flexibility significantly, it implies additional hardware
cost. And tamper-proof devices may have flaws [Ande96] in practice.
Zhu et al. [Zhu08] applied BLS signatures to aggregate emergency mes-
sages and perform batch authentication in VANETs. Their certificate ag-
gregation is for one CA. Wasef et al. [Wase09] proposed an authentication
scheme enabling each vehicle to simultaneously verify not only the signatures
but also the certificates in the PKI scenario. They also employed aggregate
signatures at the stage of signature verification. This method increases the
vehicle capability to verify a large number of signatures and certificates in a
timely manner. However, their proposal does not consider message relay nor
evidence storage, which are both critical concerns in VANETs.
2.3 Privacy-preserving LBS protocols
Mobile networks and positioning technologies create a strong market push for
location-based services (LSBs) offered to the users based on their locations.
In the United States, Nextel and Sprint initially drove the LBS adoption with
a focus on fleet applications [Sprint]. The NextBus [NextBus] service pro-
vides location-based transportation data. The CyberGuide [Abow97] project
investigates context-aware location-based electronic guide assistants, and the
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Phase II E911 requires wire-
less carriers to provide precise location information within 125 m in most
cases for emergency purposes [Reed98]. Verizon Wireless also entered the
market and currently has five applications available[ERIZONWireless]. More
applications of LBSs can be found in [Shin08].
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20 State of the Art
It is attractive to introduce LBS into VANETs. The above proposals focus
on security and privacy in safety-related applications of VANETs. However,
none of them studies user privacy protection when vehicles access LBS ap-
plications. To fill this gap, Sampigethaya et al. [Samp07] proposed a scheme
called AMOEBA. In their scheme, the group concept3 is introduced to pro-
vide robust anonymous access to prevent the profiling by LBS applications
accessed by any target vehicle. With this concept, a group leader (a single
vehicle in the group) is selected to represent the group, and used as a proxy
for LBS access. However, we notice that VANETs are very dynamic and
their connections are volatile; hence, the groups in this kind of networks are
hard to maintain. Also, there are additional weaknesses. Firstly, the leader
sacrifices its location privacy by continually revealing its locations. Secondly,
the use of the leader as a proxy for LBS access implies the lack of end-to-
end connectivity between the service provider and group members. Thirdly,
relying on one leader suffers from the single point of failure problem.
3Grouping vehicles thwarts the location tracking of any target vehicle.
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In this chapter, we review bilinear maps, related complexity assumptions and
the batch verification lemma.
3.1 Bilinear maps
Recently, bilinear maps have been extensively investigated to build efficient
schemes [Bold07, Bone01a, Bone01b, Came07, Zhan09a, Zhan09b, Zhan10a].
Our protocols are also implemented with bilinear maps. Thus, we briefly
review them.
Let G1,G2,GT be three multiplicative groups of prime order p. Let g1
denote a generator of G1, g2 be a generator of G2, ψ be a computable iso-
morphism from G2 to G1, with ψ(g2) = g1. A map ê : G1 × G2 −→ GT is
called a bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(ua, vb) = ê(u, v)ab for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Z∗p.
2. Non-degeneracy: ê(g1, g2) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(u, v)
21
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for any u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2.
Such a bilinear map ê can be constructed with the modified Weil [Mene93]
or Tate [Frey94] or Eta [Hess06] pairings on elliptic curves. ψ can be a trace
map as described in [Bone01a], and when G1 = G2 and g1 = g2, ψ can be
the identity map.
3.2 Complexity assumptions
The security of our protocol is based on the hardness of the following prob-
lems, which are as follows:
Computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) Problem in (G1,G2): Given
(ga1 , g
b
2) for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗p, compute gab1 .
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem in G1: given g1, ga1 , gb1, u ∈
G1 for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗p, decide whether u = gab1 .
Co-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (co-DBDH) Problem in (G1,
G2): Given g1, ga1 , gb1 ∈ G1, u ∈ G2, y ∈ GT for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗p, decide
whether y = (g1, Q)
ab.
q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Problem in (G1,G2): Given a (q+2)-




2 , ..., g
sq
2 ) as input, output a pair (g
1/(s+x)
1 , x) where x ∈ Z∗p.
Decision Linear Problem in G1: Given u, v, h, ua, vb, hc ∈ G1 as input,
output “yes” if a + b = c and “no” otherwise.
k-CAA2 Problem in (G1,G2): Given u, v ∈ G1, g2, gγ2 ∈ G2 and pairs
(Ai, ei, λi) with distinct and nonzero ei’s satisfying A
ei+γ
i v
λi = u for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
as input, output a pair (Ak+1, ek+1, λk+1) satisfying A
γ+ek+1
k+1 v
λk+1 = u, with
ek+1 6= ei for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
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3.3 Batch verification lemma 23
The co-CDH assumption in (G1,G2) (resp. DDH assumption in G1, co-
DBDH assumption in (G1,G2), q-SDH assumption in (G1,G2), Decision Lin-
ear assumption in G1 and k-CAA2 assumption in (G1,G2)) is that there is no
polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the co-CDH problem in (G1,G2)
(resp. DDH problem in G1, co-DBDH problem in (G1,G2), q-SDH problem
in (G1,G2), Decision Linear problem in G1 and k-CAA2 problem in (G1,G2))
with non-negligible probability.
3.3 Batch verification lemma
In a VANET, each vehicle periodically sends messages every 100-300 ms
within a distance of 10 s travel time [DSRC], which means a distance range
between 10 m and 300 m. This implies that a vehicle will receive a large num-
ber of messages to be verified in a given interval. If the signatures are verified
one by one, this verification delay is usually much greater than the allowed
maximum end-to-end message processing delay, i.e. 100 ms [European].
Hence, we need additional mechanisms to speed up message verification in
large-scale VANETs.
As noted in Section 1.2.2 above, the great redundancy of vehicular com-
munications can be exploited to alleviate the burden of message verifica-
tion. Only a small fraction of relevant messages actually need verification.
If the number of messages selected for verification is still large, additional
ways to reduce the verification overhead need to be devised. In what fol-
lows, we employ the batch verification technique ([Bell98, Came07, Cao06,
Cheo07, Ferr09, Wu10, Yoon05]) to enable time-saving message processing in
VANETs. This technique exploits the fact that a multi-base exponentiation
(bilinear map) takes similar time as a single-base exponentiation (bilinear
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Lemma 1 (Batch verification lemma) To verify exponential equations
txii f
yi
i = 1, for i = 1, · · · , n (3.1)
where xi, yi ∈ Z∗p are known, and ti, fi are two elements of a finite cyclic
group G of prime order p, one can randomly pick a vector1 ∆ = (δ1, · · · , δn)





i = 1. (3.2)
If Equations (3.1) are accepted whenever Equation (3.2) holds, a batch
{(ti, fi)|i = 1, · · · , n}
will be always accepted if it is valid while an invalid batch will be accepted
with probability at most 2−l.
The above claim can also naturally be extended to batch verification of
bilinear map equations since these are indeed exponentiation equations in
GT . In this case, we only need to additionally note that 1 = ê(t1, h)aê(t2, h)b
can be equivalently rewritten as 1 = ê(ta1t
b
2, h) to save computations due to
bilinearity and the fact that exponentiations in G1 are more efficient than
those in GT .
1We notice that, in [Cheo07], width-w Non-Adjacent Forms (w-NAFs) are also intro-
duced to accelerate the batch verification procedure.
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We observe that existing privacy-preserving protocols for securing VANETs
face several challenges such as efficient certificate distribution and revocation,
avoidance of computation and communication bottlenecks, and reduction of
the strong dependence on tamper-proof devices. This chapter addresses these
challenges by exploiting the features of vehicular mobility, road limitations,
and densely distributed RSUs. We propose a decentralized authentication
protocol1 which, unlike the existing proposals, uses RSUs to maintain an on-
the-fly generated group within their communication range, which is normally
much longer than the V2V communication range. Vehicles can anonymously
broadcast V2V messages that can be verified by other vehicles in the group
1The protocol is still centralized in the system set-up stage for enrolling vehicles. The
term “decentralized authentication” refers to the group authentication being maintained
by each distributed RSU to achieve robustness and scalability, rather than by a centralized
authority as in most existing protocols employing group signatures.
25
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and neighboring groups.
In our system, vehicles only request a new secret member key when (i)
they pass by an RSU for the first time or (ii) when their existing secret mem-
ber keys expire. Since each vehicle only verifies messages from vehicles that
have moved into the range of the same RSU and its neighbors, it can eas-
ily check whether the anonymous sender was revoked with the help of those
RSUs and does not need to retrieve the revocation list from a remote cen-
tralized authority. This greatly reduces the certificate management overhead.
Compared with the millions of vehicles in a VANET, the number of active
vehicles within range of a single RSU is much smaller. Hence, the system
will not suffer from computation and communication bottlenecks. Although
each party in our system needs a secret member key, the system’s master
key is only known and stored by a centralized authority, rather than be-
ing stored in each tamper-proof device embedded in vehicles. Furthermore,
our system is robust since, if some RSUs occasionally collapse, only vehicles
moving in those areas will be affected, and our protocol can still work with
slight changes. Due to the numerous RSUs sharing the load to maintain the
system, its performance does not significantly degrade when more vehicles
join the VANET; hence, the system is scalable.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives
some preliminaries, including the network model, the security requirements,
and the concepts of signcryption and group signature. Our efficient condi-
tional privacy-preserving protocol is explained in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3,
the security of our protocol is examined. The performance of our protocol is
evaluated in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 is a summary.
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Figure 4.1: The network model
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Network model
Figure 4.1 illustrates the network model employed in our robust and scalable
privacy-preserving vehicular authentication system. It consists of a Trusted
Authority (TA), a Tracing Manager (TM), RSUs and vehicles.
• TA: The responsibility of the TA is to issue digital certificates for vehi-
cles and RSUs. Also, it maintains a Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
containing the certificates of revoked vehicles. The TA is assumed to
be completely trustable, hard to compromise, and powerful, i.e. with
sufficient computation and storage capacity.
• TM: When the content of a safety message broadcast by a vehicle is
found to be false, the TM should be able to determine the vehicle’s real
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28 Robust and Scalable Privacy-Preserving Vehicular Authentication
identity.
• RSU: RSUs are densely distributed in the road side. In our protocol,
RSUs are used to issue secret member keys to vehicles and assist the
TM to efficiently track the real identity of a vehicle from any safety
message.
• Vehicle: Vehicles move along the roads, sharing collective environmen-
tal information, contained in safety messages, or requesting secret mem-
ber keys from RSUs. OBUs are assumed to be embedded in each vehi-
cle. By using OBUs, vehicles can communicate with each other as well
as with the RSUs. The communication among them is based on the
DSRC protocol [DSRC].
4.1.2 Security requirements
We consider several security requirements [Raya07, Lin07] in two communi-
cation scenarios: (i) confidential communication between a vehicle and an
RSU; and (ii) V2V communication. The first scenario has three security
requirements: confidential communication, message authentication and pri-
vacy protection; the second scenario should satisfy: message authentication,
privacy protection and anonymity revocability. The detailed descriptions of
the above requirements follow.
• Confidential communication. When a vehicle communicates with
an RSU, only that vehicle and that RSU are aware of the information
exchange. In our protocol, this implies that vehicles send a request
to an RSU for a secret member key without being detected by other
vehicles and receive a secret member key from the RSU secretly.
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• Message authentication. If a message has been modified after be-
ing sent, this modification is observable by a legitimate receiver. In
addition, if the message has never been modified, it confirms to the
legitimate receiver that the message was originated by a legitimate en-
tity.
• Privacy protection. As mentioned above, privacy is an important
concern in VANETs. We consider the following two cases.
1. If the communication takes place between vehicles and RSUs, pri-
vacy means that an eavesdropper cannot decide whether two dif-
ferent messages come from the same vehicle.
2. If the communication is between vehicles, privacy means that de-
ciding whether two different valid messages were generated by the
same vehicle is computationally hard for everyone except the TM.
• Anonymity revocability. The TM has the ability to retrieve the real
identity of dishonest vehicles sending fake messages to other vehicles in
order to disrupt traffic.
4.1.3 Signcryption
Our protocol uses a signcryption scheme and a group signature scheme. The
signcryption scheme is used to help a vehicle to receive a secret member
key from an RSU secretly. Signcryption [Zhen97], is a public-key primitive
which has the ingredients of both digital signature and data encryption. A
signcryption scheme allows a sender to simultaneously sign and encrypt a
message. An attractive point is that it takes less computational time and
it has a lower message expansion rate than the sign-then-encrypt procedure
[Zhen97].
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The basic requirements for a signcryption scheme are that it should satisfy
the properties of message confidentiality and signature unforgeability.
• Message confidentiality. It allows the communicating parties to
preserve the secrecy of their exchanges. This property can be used to
fulfill the “confidential communication” requirement in VANETs.
• Signature unforgeability. A signcryption scheme offering non-repudiation
prevents the sender of a signcrypted message from repudiating her sig-
nature. This can fulfill the “message authentication” requirement in
VANETs.
Privacy is an important concern in VANETs. The signcryption scheme
should also satisfy the “ciphertext anonymity” property that is defined by
Boyen [Boye03]. Ciphertext anonymity captures the property that the ci-
phertext must contain no information in the clear that identifies the sender
or recipient of the message.
• Ciphertext anonymity. A ciphertext should look anonymous to ev-
eryone but the actual recipient. The identities of both the sender and
the recipient of the ciphertext should stay hidden from third parties.
The “privacy protection” requirement in VANETs can be satisfied by
this property.
The signcryption scheme in [Li07] is shown to satisfy message confiden-
tiality, signature unforgeability and ciphertext anonymity. We employ this
signcryption scheme to help a vehicle to safely receive secret member keys
from RSUs.
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In our system, after receiving a secret member key from an RSU, each vehicle
can anonymously send messages on behalf of the group maintained by this
RSU, by using a group signature scheme. Group signatures [Chau91] allow
the members of a group to sign on behalf of the group. Everyone can verify
the signature with a group public key while no one can know the identity
of the signer except the the opener (In our protocol, the TM acts as the
opener). Further, it is computationally hard to decide whether two different
signatures were issued by the same member. We employ a group signature
scheme to secure V2V communications.
Due to the security requirements of VANETs, the group signature scheme
employed should satisfy the following properties:
• Unforgeability. Only the group members can sign messages on behalf
of the group. This fulfills the “message authentication” requirement in
VANETs.
• Unlinkability. Deciding whether two different valid signatures were
computed by the same group member is computationally hard for any-
one except the opener. This can deal with the “privacy protection”
requirement in VANETs.
• Traceability. The opener (TM) is always able to open a valid signa-
ture and identify the signer. It can use this property to address the
“anonymity revocability” requirement in VANETs.
Our protocol employs the signcryption scheme defined in [Li07] and the
group signature scheme defined in [Ferr09]. The security of the signcryp-
tion is based on the co-CDH assumption in (G1,G2) and the security of the
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group signature scheme in [Ferr09] is based on the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman
assumption in (G1,G2) and the Decision Linear assumption in G1.
4.2 A robust and scalable protocol based on
on-the-fly groups
In this section, we propose a concrete robust and scalable protocol based
on on-the-fly groups for VANETs. This protocol employs the signcryption
scheme defined in [Li07] and the group signature scheme proposed in [Ferr09]
as building blocks. The signcryption scheme is used to help a vehicle to obtain
a secret member key from an RSU secretly, and the group signature scheme
is used for V2V communications.
4.2.1 High-level description
We outline the basic ideas in our decentralized privacy-preserving authen-
tication protocol to secure vehicular communications. Figure 4.2 illustrates
those basic ideas.
In our system, we let each RSU maintain an on-the-fly generated group
consisting of vehicles that occasionally enter the RSU’s communication range.
The RSU will periodically broadcast its own certificate and its neighbor
RSUs’ certificates to the vehicles within its range. When a vehicle V passes by
an RSU, if it is the first time it sees this RSU or if the vehicle’s current secret
member key has expired, the vehicle V and the RSU will run a KeyRequest
protocol. V sends a signcrypted message ρ to the RSU to request a secret
member key. When the RSU receives the request, first it de-signcrypts the
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Figure 4.2: Basic ideas in the decentralized protocol
message ρ to obtain the plaintext m (which includes a session key, a times-
tamp, the certificate of V and a signature) and checks whether V is entitled
to obtain a secret member key (i.e., an anonymous group certificate), accord-
ing to certain security policies to be detailed in specific implementations. If
V satisfies the security criteria, a secure channel between V and the RSU
will be opened and a secret member key generated by the RSU will be sent
back to the vehicle V through the secure channel. After receiving the secret
member key, V can anonymously sign with a group signature scheme any
V2V messages during its stay within range of RSU. These signed messages
can be verified by other vehicles in the areas covered by the current and
neighboring RSUs. Most messages are about regular driving status informa-
tion and do not need to be forwarded. In case of important messages, after
verifying them, vehicles can sign again and forward them to other vehicles
in the areas covered by the current RSU and its neighbors. This will allow
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Figure 4.3: Collapsed RSU 2
important messages to be disseminated to the whole VANET.
The local processing of messages by the RSUs within range results in
increased efficiency and robustness. As to efficiency, since each vehicle only
verifies messages from vehicles that move into the range of the same RSU and
its neighbors, it can easily check whether the anonymous sender was revoked
with the help of the neighboring RSUs and does not need to retrieve the
revocation list from a remote centralized authority. Regarding robustness, if
some RSUs collapse, only vehicles entering the areas of those RSUs will be
affected, and our protocol can still work with slight changes. For instance, as
shown in Figure 4.3, assume that vehicle V has obtained the secret member
key from RSU 1 and it is now in the cover range of RSU 2, which has
collapsed. In this case, V can still use the secret member key from RSU 1
to sign the messages before it can join the group maintained by RSU 3; and
RSU 1/3 only needs to broadcast a notification and the certificates of RSU
3/1 in its area as well. This mechanism may slightly decrease the security of
the VANET in the case that a vehicle cannot get the up-to-date certificates
of nearby RSUs (this problem can be alleviated by requesting the updated
certificates from other vehicles, using a multi-hop mechanism).
We note that, in the early stages of VANET deployment, RSUs may not
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be densely distributed. They are more likely to be deployed in metropolitan
areas which suffer from heavy traffic. It seems reasonable to assume that
there will be some sporadic RSUs in the early stage of VANETs, although
the density of RSUs might not be very high. In this case, a measure similar to
that in the above paragraph can be used to alleviate the dependence of RSUs.
Finally, if the density of vehicles in an area is extremely low, similarly to the
centralized group signature-based protocol in [Lin07], our protocol can also
be used as a centralized authentication scheme. Furthermore, in Chapter 5,
we will propose a set of mechanisms to address the security, privacy, and
management requirements in a large-scale VANET without the assumption
of densely distributed RSUs.
4.2.2 The concrete protocol
In this section, we describe our robust and scalable protocol for secure vehic-
ular communication in detail. Our protocol consists of five stages: System
Setup, Key Issuance, Re-Key Issuance, Signing, Batch Verification and Trac-
ing.
Before describing our protocol, we first explain the notation used to sim-
plify the description.
. TA: It is a trusted authority and can be viewed as an electronic counter-
part of the traffic administration office in the real world. The TA owns the
system’s master key which is used to issue digital certificates for vehicles and
RSUs. It also maintains a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) which contains
the certificates of the revoked vehicles.
. TM: It is the tracing manager. It can be instantiated by the traffic police.
It is able to trace the identity of a vehicle having generated a certain safety
message.
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Table 4.1: Format of a safety message: fields and lengths
Group ID Payload Timestamp Signature
2 bytes 100 bytes 4 bytes 368 bytes
. Ri: The i-th RSU. The responsibility of an RSU in our protocol is to issue
secret member keys for vehicles.
. Vi: The i-th vehicle.
. IDVi : The identity of Vi.
. TP : A timestamp.
. CertRi : The certificate of Ri.
. CertVi : The certificate of Vi.
. EK(.)/DK(.): The encryption/decryption algorithm of a symmetric-key
encryption scheme, where K is a key which specifies the particular transfor-
mation of plaintext into ciphertext during encryption, or vice versa during
decryption.
. SK: A session key that will be used as the key of EK(.)/DK(.).
. ||: The message concatenation operation.
. SM : A safety message. The format of a safety message sent by a vehicle
is shown in Table 4.1.
The Group ID is used to identify to which group a vehicle belongs and
its length is 2 bytes. Position, current time, direction, speed, accelera-
tion/deceleration, traffic events, etc. of a vehicle are included in the message
payload. According to [USDe], the length of a payload is 100 bytes. We add
the timestamp into a safety message to prevent the message replay attack.
The last field is the signature of the first three parts of the safety message.
The length of a signature in our protocol is 368 bytes (we will elaborate on
that later). Therefore, the total message length is 474 bytes.
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Now we describe the System Setup, Key Issuance, Re-Key Issuance, Sign-
ing, Batch Verification and Tracing stages of our protocol in detail.
System Setup. At this stage, the TA generates the parameters for the whole
system by using the TAKeyGen algorithm. Using the TMKeyGen algorithm,
the TM generates its private and public keys. Similarly, each RSU or Vehicle
generate their private and public keys by using RKeyGen or VKeyGen.
• TAKeyGen: TA proceeds as follows:
1. Select p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, ψ, ê as Section 3.1.
2. Choose cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ −→ G1, H2 :
{0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}f , H3 : {0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗p and EK(.)/DK(.).
3. Publish the system parameters as
params = (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, ψ, ê, H1 ∼ H3, EK(.)/DK(.)),
where f is the total length of the messages to be signcrypted.
params are pre-stored in the TM and in each Ri, Vi.
• TMKeyGen: Randomly select h ∈ G∗1, x, y ∈ Z∗p, and set u, v ∈ G1 such
that ux = vy = h. The TM’s public key is gTM = (h, u, v). The private
key of TM is sTM = (x, y). TM’s public key is pre-stored in each Ri,
Vi.
• RKeyGen: Select ζi ∈ Z∗p at random, and compute wi = gζi2 . The
private and public keys of an RSU Ri are ζi and wi, respectively, and
the corresponding certificate of Ri is CertRi .
• VKeyGen: Choose a random ξi ∈ Z∗p, and compute pkVi = gξi2 . Vehicle
Vi’s private and public keys are ξi and pkVi , respectively, while CertVi
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is Vi’s certificate.
Note that the certificates of vehicles and RSUs are issued by the TA.
Key Issuance. In this stage a vehicle joins a group maintained by an RSU. An
RSU is assumed to be more powerful than a vehicle, and its communication
range longer. RSUs are distributed in the road side and they broadcast their
certificates and the ones of their adjacent RSUs. When Vi passes by Ri, if
Vi is already a member of the current group maintained by Ri, then Ri does
nothing. Otherwise, Vi requests a secret member key from Ri by using the
KeyRequest protocol:
• KeyRequest: This is an interactive protocol run between Vi and Ri.
Vi has private and public keys ξi and pkVi , respectively, and certifi-
cate CertVi ; Ri has private and public keys ζi and wi, respectively,
and certificate CertRi . This protocol employs the signcryption scheme
described in [Li07] and consists of three steps:
1. At this step, Vi takes as input SK, TP, CertVi , ξi to generate a
signcrypted message and sends the signcrypted message to Ri. To
do this, Vi does the following:
(a) Choose a session key SK.





σ = H1(SK||CertVi||TP ||s||wi||ψ(wri ))ξi
ϕ = (SK||TP ||CertVi||σ)⊕H2(s||wi||ψ(wri )).
(c) Send ρ = (s, ϕ) to Ri.
2. After receiving ρ = (s, ϕ) from Vi, Ri first de-signcrypts ρ to
get the plaintext. It checks the validity of the signature and the
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certificate in the plaintext. If they are valid, a secure channel
between Ri and Vi is opened. Through this secure channel, a
secret member key will be returned to Vi. The concrete procedure
is as follows
(a) Compute the plain text
(SK||TP ||CertVi||σ) = ϕ⊕H2(s||wi||sζi).
(b) Check the validity of CertVi . If it is invalid, ‘abort’; otherwise,
extract pkVi from CertVi .
(c) Verify the signature by checking
ê(σ, g2)
?
= ê(H1(SK||CertVi||TP ||s||wi||sζi), pkVi).
If the check is satisfied, using ζi, generate a tuple (ηi, θi):






(d) Compute κ = ESK((TP ||ηi||θi)) and send κ to Vi.
(e) Store (CertVi , ηi) to Ri’s database.
3. When Vi receives κ from Ri, it computes (TP
′||ηi||θi) = DSK(κ).
If TP = TP ′, Vi accepts the secret member key (ηi, θi), where TP
is the timestamp used by Vi in the first step.
Note that, to further enhance the anonymity of a vehicle and reduce
the frequency of interaction between vehicles and RSUs, we can let several
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seriate RSUs (e.g., all the RSUs along the same street) to share the same
private/public key.
Re-Key Issuance. A vehicle Vi can revoke its certificate CertVi for some
reasons, for example when its private key has been stolen. If this happens,
to ensure the security of the VANET, the RSUs whose databases contain
CertVi should update their private/public keys as well as their certificates.
Specifically, if an RSU Ri finds that there is a certificate CertVi in the CRL
and (CertVj , ηj) on Ri’s database such that CertVi = CertVj , Ri runs the
following ReKey protocol.
• ReKey: This protocol consists of the following steps:
1. Ri first runs RKeyGen to generate a new private/public key pair
(ζ ′i, w
′
i) and the corresponding certificate Cert
′
Ri
. After this step,
the public key of the group maintained by Ri is updated to w
′
i.
2. Then Ri broadcasts within its communication range its new cer-
tificate and a lifetime (during this lifetime, both the new certificate
and the old certificate of Ri are considered valid).
3. When a vehicle Vi receives the above messages from Ri, it should
launch the KeyRequest protocol used in the Key Issuance stage
to request a fresh secret member key corresponding to the new
public key w′i of Ri.
Signing. As mentioned above, if a vehicle broadcasts a message M (M =
Group ID|| Payload||Timestamp) directly without any secure mechanism,
VANETs may suffer from some serious attacks. To avoid or detect those
attacks and simultaneously protect the privacy of users, we use the group
signature scheme proposed by Ferrara et al. in [Ferr09]. Before sending a
message M , Vi first signs it by using the following VBSign algorithm:
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• VBSign: Let (ηi||θi) be Vi’s secret member key, Vi computes the group
signature πVi on M as follows



































sα = rα + cα
sβ = rβ + cβ
sθ = rθ + cθi
sγ1 = rγ1 + cγ1
sγ2 = rγ2 + cγ2
5. Output the group signature
πVi = (T1, T2, T3, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, sα, sβ, sθ, sγ1 , sγ2).
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Batch Verification. A vehicle may receive many safety-related messages from
other vehicles in a very short time. Before accepting these safety messages, it
should first verify their validity by checking the signatures of the safety mes-
sages. As remarked in [Wu10], fast validation of vehicular messages is crucial
for a wide deployment of VANETs in practice. To meet this requirement, we
use the batch verification technique described in Section 3.3. When a vehicle
receives safety messages from other vehicles in the group maintained by Ri
whose public key is wi, it runs the following VBVerify algorithm to check the
validity of these safety messages.
• VBVerify: Assuming a vehicle should verify n safety messages at the
same time. Let
πj = (T1,j, T2,j, T3,j, R1,j, R2,j, R3,j, R4,j, R5,j, sα,j, sβ,j, sθ,j, sγ1,j, sγ2,j)
be the signature on the message Mj in the j-th safety message. For
each j = 1, ..., n, first compute
cj = H3(Mj, T1,j, T2,j, T3,j, R1,j, R2,j, R3,j, R4,j, R5,j)
and take random width-w non-adjacent forms (w-NAFs, [Cheo07])















(−sα,j−sβ,j)δjT cjδj3 ), wi).
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by picking random w-NAFs [Cheo07] %1,1, ..., %1,n; %2,1, ..., %2,n; %3,1, ..., %3,n;






















Finally, accept the safety messages if and only if all checks succeed.
The bilinear map operation is the most time-consuming operation in the
above VBVerify algorithm. Using the batch verification technique requires
only two (rather than 2n) bilinear map operations. In addition to saving
in bilinear map computation, the above batch verification performs approx-
imately 4.8 times faster than the individual verifications [Cheo07].
Tracing. Malicious entities (vehicles) may exist in VANETs. They may send
fake messages to other vehicles to influence the traffic. If this happens, the
TM can disclose the identity of the actual sender by invoking the following
Open algorithm.
• Open: This algorithm is used by TM to trace a signature included in a
safety message. Let
πVi = (T1, T2, T3, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, sα, sβ, sθ, sγ1 , sγ2)
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be a valid signature on Mi under an RSU’s public key wi (according
to the group ID in Mi, TM can download the public key of the corre-
sponding RSU from TA). TM proceeds as follows:
1. Recover the vehicle’s ηi as ηi = T3/(T
x
1 · T y2 ).
2. Get (CertVi , ηi) from RSU’s database.
3. Extract IDVi from CertVi .
4.3 Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed protocol. We will
show that our protocol meets all the security requirements described in Sec-
tion 4.1.2.
We first consider the scenario of a confidential communication between a
vehicle and an RSU. It can be divided in two phases.
• The first is the vehicle-to-RSU communication phase. This scenario
has three security requirements: confidential communication, message
authentication and privacy protection. In this phase, a vehicle Vi that
wants to join a group maintained by Ri, first selects a session key, gener-
ates a ciphertext ρ by using a signcryption scheme which takes as input
the session key, a timestamp TP , etc.; then Vi sends ρ to Ri. Since
the signcryption scheme we choose satisfies the message confidential-
ity, signature unforgeability and ciphertext anonymity properties which
provide confidential communication, message authentication and pri-
vacy protection, respectively, it is easy to see that the communications
in this phase meet the desired security requirements in VANETs.
• The second phase is the RSU-to-vehicle communication. This scenario
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also has three security requirements: confidential communication, mes-
sage authentication and privacy protection. In this phase, Ri first ex-
tracts the secret member key (ηi, θi) for Vi, then uses the session key SK
received from Vi and the symmetric-key encryption algorithm ESK(.)
to encrypt (TP ||ηi||θi) and get the ciphertext κ, and finally sends the
ciphertext κ to Vi. Since only Vi knows the corresponding session key,
only Vi can decrypt (TP
′||ηi||θi) from κ. Therefore, the confidential
communication requirement is guaranteed. Furthermore, the session
key is only used once. Hence, privacy protection is also satisfied. After
getting (TP ′||ηi||θi), Vi checks TP ?= TP ′. This is used to fulfill the
message authentication requirement.
Finally, we turn to the V2V communication scenario. The security re-
quirements of message authentication, privacy protection and anonymity re-
vocability should hold in this scenario. Here, the group signature scheme
is used in our protocol and the group signature has the unforgeability, un-
linkability and traceability properties which ensure message authentication,
privacy protection and anonymity revocability, respectively. Hence, the de-
sired security requirements for this scenario are naturally fulfilled.
4.4 Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our protocol by comparing
it with the up-to-date protocols GSIS [Lin07] and ECPP [Lu08], which offer
similar security and privacy properties.
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4.4.1 Transmission overhead of safety messages
According to DSRC [DSRC], a vehicle sends each message with a time inter-
val from 100 to 300 ms. and the minimal data rate in DSRC is 6 Mbps (for
safety messaging it is typically 12 Mbps). In the following, we will consider
two scenarios. Our analyses show that our protocol is practical in both of
them.
First, we consider a six-lane two-way highway, each lane being 3 m wide.
We assume a uniform presence of vehicles, with an inter-vehicle space of 30
m. Vehicles are in movement and transmit DSRC safety messages every 300
ms over a 300 m communication range. According to [Raya07], a vehicle can
hear at most 120 vehicles per 300 ms, which amounts to a system throughput
of 1.45 Mbps (120×3.33×474×8
1024×1024 Mbps). This throughput is much smaller than 6
Mbps.
Second, we consider the same highway but this time vehicles are very slow
or even stopped (i.e. a congestion scenario). The vehicles are separated by
5 m (including the vehicle length). Each vehicle transmits a safety message
over a range of 15 m every 100 ms. In the worst case [Raya07], a vehicle
can hear at most 36 other vehicles per 100 ms. Hence, we have a maximal
throughput of 1.30 Mbps (36×10×474×8
1024×1024 Mbps), which is also smaller than the
minimum bandwidth available of 6 Mbps.
4.4.2 RSU service efficiency
In this section, we compare the RSU service efficiency (the cost for a vehicle
to receive a secret member key or a short-time anonymous certificate from
an RSU) of our protocol with the ECPP protocol.
According to the execution time results shown in [Scot07], the measured
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Table 4.2: RSU service efficiency
TV TR Rounds
ECPP 3 ms (5τe) 10.2 ms (2τm, 2τe) 2
Our Protocol 1.8 ms (3τe) 10.2 ms (2τm, 2τe) 1
processing time2 for one bilinear map operation (τm) is about 4.5 ms and the
time for one point exponentiation (τe) is about 0.6 ms. In the sequel, we de-
note by TV the computation overhead of a vehicle and by TR the computation
overhead of an RSU.
From Table 4.2, regarding the computational cost, we can find that the
RSU service efficiency of our protocol is slightly better than the efficiency
of the ECPP protocol in [Lu08]. In addition, our protocol is round-efficient.
To obtain a secret member key from an RSU, our protocol requires only one
round, while the ECPP requires two rounds (for a short-time anonymous
certificate). A two-round protocol causes more delay than a single-round
one. Sometimes, a vehicle may pass by an RSU at a very high speed. Hence,
if a two-round protocol is used, the vehicle may not receive the secret member
key or the short-time anonymous certificate in time.
4.4.3 Computational overhead of signature verification
This section compares the computational overhead of signature verification
in our protocol with that in ECPP and GSIS (V2V communication scenario).
With our protocol, to verify n safety messages (essentially, to verify n
signatures in n safety messages) from the same group, the required time cost
2For an MNT curve [Miya01] of embedding degree k = 6 and 160-bit q, and an imple-
mentation run on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHZ machine.
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is
To = 2τm +
14nτe
4.8
= 2× 4.5 + 14n× 0.6
4.8
ms.
Generally, a vehicle may receive safety messages from at most two groups.
The required time cost to verify n safety messages from two different groups
is
T ′o = 4τm +
14nτe
4.8
= 4× 4.5 + 14n× 0.6
4.8
ms.
With ECPP, to verify n safety messages, the time cost is
TE = 3nτm + 11nτe = 3n× 4.5 + 11n× 0.6 ms.
With GSIS, the time cost of verifying n safety messages increases with the
number of revoked certificates of vehicles in the revocation list. It is fair to
compare our protocol with GSIS when the revocation list is empty. In this
case, the computation time of signature verification with GSIS is
TG = 5nτm + 12nτe = 5n× 4.5 + 11n× 0.6 ms.
Figure 4.4 shows the time cost ratio T1 = To/TE and T2 = To/TG. Figure 4.5
shows the time cost ratio T3 = T ′o/TE and T4 = T
′
o/TG.
From Figures 4.4 and 4.5, it is apparent that the computational overhead
of signature verification in our protocol is always much lower than that in
[Lin07, Lu08]. This advantage of our protocol is more obvious when the num-
ber of vehicles within the communication range grows. In VANETs, vehicles
broadcast safety messages every 100-300 ms to other vehicles. In this way, a
vehicle may receive lots of safety messages from other vehicles in a very short
period of time. Hence, the efficiency of the signature verification is vital when
the number of vehicles within the communication range is high. In [Lin07],
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Figure 4.4: Time efficiency ratio T1 = To/TE and T2 = To/TG























Figure 4.5: Time efficiency ratio T3 = T ′o/TE and T4 = T
′
o/TG
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the group signature can only be verified one by one, while in [Lu08], before
verifying a signature from a vehicle, one should first verify the short-time
anonymous certificate of the vehicle. In contrast, in our protocol, no short-
time anonymous certificates are required and the batch verification technique
is used. This largely improves the efficiency of our signature verification.
4.4.4 Simulation
In this section, by using NS-2 [NS2], we carry out some simulations to eval-
uate the average message delay and message loss rate to determine the prac-
tical performance of our protocol. In our simulations, the road scenario
considered covers an area of 1 × 1 km2 and is shown in Figure 4.6. The
vehicles were generated at random and their average speed was 56 km/h,
which is typical in urban areas. The communication range of each vehicle
is from 10 m to 300 m. The channel bandwidth bound is 6 Mbps and the
packet size is 474 bytes (see Section 4.2.2). For each experiment, the simula-
tion time is 200 s. In addition, since the communication range of an RSU is
much longer than the one of a vehicle, for most cases, a vehicle only verifies
safety messages from the members in the same on-the-fly group. As shown
in Section 4.4.3, to verify n safety messages, the required time cost is
To = 2× 4.5 + 14n× 0.6
4.8
ms.
























where D is the sample district in the simulation, LD is the number of vehicles
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Figure 4.6: Road scenario corresponding to a square area of size 1× 1 km2
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Figure 4.7: Impact of authentication on message delay
in D, M`→ is the number of messages sent by vehicle `, K` is the number
of vehicles within a one-hop communication range of vehicle `, T
`m→
sgn is the
time taken by vehicle ` to sign message m, T
`m→k
trnsmsn is the time taken to
transmit message m from vehicle ` to vehicle k, τ is the time period taken
to perform a batch verification and MAD is the maximum allowable delay




, where Vm is the total number of vehicles processing m
among the K` vehicles, and vm,j is the number of vehicles processing m in the
interval ((j − 1)τ, jτ ] for jτ ≤ MAD. Clearly, we have that Vm =
∑
vm,j.
The average message delay Dmsg reflects the average time latency for a
message to be processed and must be smaller than MAD. Figure 4.7 shows
the relationship between Dmsg, the vehicle density and the batch verifica-
tion period τ . From this figure, one can see that, for a fixed vehicle density,
Dmsg increases with τ . For a fixed τ , in the case of very low density, Dmsg
sharply grows when the vehicle density is increased from 10/km2 to 30/km2.
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However, the delay stabilizes for vehicle densities above 30/km2. These ex-
perimental results seem to contradict the intuition that the delay will keep
increasing as more messages will be received for verification. We observe
that such a stable curve is due to the fact that most received messages can
be verified in batch, and the average message delay does not increase for
larger densities. We also note that, for all combinations of different densi-
ties and batch verification intervals, the average message delay is lower than
MAD = 100 ms, which implies that our protocol works well for various traffic
environments.
When the arriving messages surpass the processing capacity of the vehicle
in a batch verification period, some messages cannot be verified, which results
in message loss due to the authentication mechanism. The average message
loss (induced by cryptographic operations) rate can be computed as follows:






where nτ is the maximum number of messages that a vehicle can verify in a
given batch period τ , nvi is the number of messages that a vehicle vi receives
for verification in a given batch period τ . If nvi ≤ nτ , then we set nτnvi := 1.
Figure 4.8 shows that, when τ = 0.02 s and 0.03 s, Rloss increases as the
vehicle density grows and, when τ ≥ 0.04 s, Rloss is almost 0 for a density
between 0 vehicles/km2 and 120 vehicles/km2. This is because that when τ is
small, only a few messages are received in a batch period, and the advantage
of batch verification is not well exploited; when τ and the vehicle density
grow, the messages received in τ also grow. However, the arriving message
growth rate cannot surpass the message processing capacity which also grows
with τ .
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Figure 4.8: Impact of authentication on message loss rate
From the results illustrated in Figures 4.7 and 4.8, one may find that there
is a conflict between the average message delay Dmsg and the average mes-
sage loss rate Rloss. We expect low average message delay as lower latency
implies that vehicles can take less time to respond to the traffic environment
changes. To obtain lower average message delay, the batch verification in-
terval τ should be as small as possible. However, if τ is too small, some
messages cannot be verified and the average message loss rate grows. Hence,
a balance point has to be found, and from Figure 4.7 and 4.8, τ = 0.05 s
might be an ideal balance point.
4.5 Summary
A number of challenges such as efficient certificate distribution and revo-
cation, avoidance of computation and communication bottlenecks, and re-
duction of the strong dependence on tamper-proof devices arise in existing
protocols for securing VANETs. We have proposed a new privacy-preserving
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authentication protocol that efficiently addresses those challenges by consid-
ering the special features of vehicular mobility, road limitations and densely
distributed RSUs in VANETs. In our system, each RSU maintains an on-the-
fly generated group within its communication range, in which vehicles can
anonymously generate V2V messages, and verify anonymous V2V messages
from other vehicles. Vehicles generating false/bogus messages can be traced
by a third party. Our scheme has been shown to be robust, scalable and
practical. Furthermore, it clearly outperforms state-of-the-art alternatives in
the case of dense traffic.
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At the early stage of VANET deployment, the RSUs may not be well dis-
tributed. In this chapter, we propose a set of mechanisms to address the secu-
rity, privacy, and management requirements of a large-scale VANET without
the assumption of densely distributed RSUs. The conflicting requirements
are conciliated by exploiting identity-based group signatures (IBGSs). IBGSs
allow us to divide a large-scale VANET into a number of easy-to-manage
smaller groups. This feature greatly reduces the security-related manage-
ment challenges.
In the system, each party, including the group managers (i.e., the trans-
portation offices) and the signers (i.e., the vehicles), has a unique, human-
recognizable identity as its public key, and a corresponding secret key gen-
erated by some trusted escrow authority. For instance, the public keys of
57
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the administration offices, road-side units [Lee99] and vehicles can be, re-
spectively, the administration name, the RSU geographical address and the
traditional vehicle license plate. This eliminates the overhead of managing
public key certificates in VANETs: certificates are no longer needed because
the public key of each party is a human-recognizable identity. After register-
ing to transportation offices, any vehicle can anonymously authenticate any
message which can be verified by the identities (e.g., the name) of the trans-
portation offices and the public key of the escrow authority. If the message
is later found to be false, the identity of the message generator can be traced
by traffic police offices.
We present a number of approaches to further improve the robustness
and efficiency of the system. First, threshold secret sharing techniques are
employed in the key generation procedure so that the system can securely
work even if some trusted authorities collapse or are disabled by attackers.
This makes the system robust and avoids the so-called single-point of failure
problem of centralized systems. Second, given that emergency announce-
ments need to be processed as soon as possible, we present an emergency
authentication mechanism which introduces almost no delay. This is realized
by an offline signing technique which allows pre-authenticating messages in
the idle time to minimize the online processing time. Third, considering the
redundancy in vehicular communications, we present a selfish verification
mechanism to speed up message processing in VANETs. With this tech-
nique, although each vehicle may receive a large number of messages, the
vehicle only selects for verification those messages affecting its traffic deci-
sions. The selected messages are verified with the batch verification technique
in Section 3.3 which can verify a batch of messages as if they were a single
one. These mechanisms accelerating message processing are crucial to deploy
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VANETs in densely populated urban areas.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. A high-level descrip-
tion of our protocol is provided in Section 5.1. We propose a basic protocol
in Section 5.2 and extend it in Section 5.3. Simulations are reported in
Section 5.4 to evaluate the performance of our proposals. Section 5.5 is a
summary.
5.1 High-level description of the system
In this section, we give an overview of the proposed system.
5.1.1 Security requirements
In order to obtain an implementable system to enhance the trustworthiness
in V2V communications by conciliating public safety and vehicle privacy, we
consider the following three types of security requirements:
• Liability. Most attackers of VANETs can be assumed rational, but
there may also exist irrational attackers whose behavior cannot be pre-
dicted. Judicial deterrence or financial penalties can be effective coun-
termeasures to thwart rational attackers. Although irrational attacks
cannot be prevented, mechanisms can be devised to relieve the dam-
age, e.g., financial compensations. Hence, the fundamental security
functions in vehicular communications will consist of ensuring liability
for the originator of a data packet. Liability implies that the message
author has to be responsible for the message generated. To establish li-
ability without disputes, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation
must be provided in vehicular protocols. Authentication allows verify-
ing that the message was generated by the originator as claimed, rather
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than by an impersonator. Integrity guarantees that the message has
not been tampered with after it was sent. Non-repudiation implies that
the message generator cannot deny message authorship.
• Anonymity. There is anonymity if, by monitoring the communication
in a VANET, message originators cannot be identified, except perhaps
by designated parties. The goal is to protect the privacy of vehicles.
Since message authentication requires knowledge of a public identity
such as a public key or the license plate, if no anonymity was provided,
an attacker could easily trace any vehicle by monitoring the VANET
communication. This would be surely undesirable for the drivers.
• Revocability. Revocability means that, if necessary, designated par-
ties can identify the originator of any doubtable message. The goal here
is to conciliate personal privacy and public safety. If anonymity is real-
ized without any revocability mechanism, an attacker can anonymously
broadcast authenticated wrong messages to fool other vehicles without
fear of being caught, which contradicts the liability requirement and
may seriously compromise public safety. Revocability is critical to pro-
vide judicial arguments for law enforcement investigation and accident
reconstruction.
5.1.2 A framework using identity-based group signa-
tures
In Chapter 4, we proposed an efficient protocol for vehicle communications.
However, it relies on the existence of densely distributed RSUs. There are
other proposals [Guo07, Lin07] which are based on group signatures to secure
VANETs with conditional privacy. For these proposals to be deployable in
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Figure 5.1: Model of identity-based group signature
metropolitan areas, they must meet several constraints. It is impractical
to have millions of vehicles register to a single group, which implies that
the group public parameters may change whenever any vehicle joins/leaves
the system. It is resource-consuming to distribute these frequent changes
to all the nodes. As suggested in those recent proposals [Guo07, Lin07], it
seems reasonable to divide a large VANET into much smaller groups. A
new challenge posed by this approach is how to manage these groups. For
instance, how to convince each node that the group public keys are authentic
and up-to-date. This is a crucial concern because the uncertainty in group
public keys may cause serious security failures.
To allay the above situation and sufficiently exploit the existing trans-
portation systems, we suggest the use of identity-based group signatures
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(IBGS) to safeguard large VANETs. The notion of identity-based group sig-
natures was introduced by Weil et al. in 2005 [Wei05]. In an IBGS scheme,
there are four types of parties, i.e., the trusted escrow authority (TEA), the
group registration manager (GRM) (i.e., issuer), an identity-opening author-
ity (IOA) (i.e., opener) and the group members, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Each of them has a unique identity, i.e., its name. TEA has a public-private
key pair and the public key can be accessed by any entity. By taking as
input the identity of any entity in the system, TEA generates a private key
for that entity. Any group member having obtained a private key from TEA
can register to GRM to become a group member and then can anonymously
sign any message on behalf of the group. The signature can be verified using
TEA’s public key and the identities of GRM and IOA. If necessary, IOA can
open the identity of the signer of any doubtable signature.
We now describe an IBGS framework to simplify the system management
overhead. In most cities, the transportation administration authorities in-
clude the public security department, vehicle management bureaus and traffic
police offices, who can serve as the TEA, GRMs and IOAs, respectively. The
public security department’s public key can be stored in each vehicle. The
public keys of GRMs and IOAs are their respective identities. Each vehi-
cle’s public key is also its unique identity. GRMs and IOAs first need to
contact TEA to generate their private keys and set up the corresponding
administration units.
Vehicles can be divided in groups in light of their regulatory status, e.g.,
one can distinguish groups like police cars, ambulances, fire trucks, taxis,
buses, commercial vehicles, personal vehicles, etc. Observe that the number
of personal cars may be very large in densely populated areas and most
personal cars run around the residence of the owner. For convenience in
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management, personal vehicles can be further divided into smaller groups
according to the regions where they have registered. After contacting TEA
and obtaining the private key corresponding to its identity, each vehicle can
register to the GRM of the group to which it belongs.
After registration, a vehicle can authenticate messages anonymously. When
receiving an authenticated message, the receiver can verify it with the stored
system public key of TEA and the identity of the group the vehicle belongs
to. Note here that the signing vehicle’s identity is not required for valida-
tion of the signed message due to anonymity. If the verification procedure
indicates that the message is authentic (but not necessarily correct), then
the receiving vehicle can use it as a proof. This proof can be submitted to
the traffic police office for investigation if the message is later found to be
incorrect and causes any harm. If necessary, the police can open the identity
of the message generator and perhaps punish him/her.
Unlike the public key in traditional cryptosystems which is a long random
string that must be certified to bind it with the corresponding private key,
the identity working as public key in IBGS is human-recognizable and the
corresponding private key is generated with its identity and the TEA master
private key. Hence, there is no need of CAs in IBGS-based VANETs. This
significantly reduces the system management overhead.
5.2 Basic liability and privacy-preservation pro-
tocol
In this section, we propose an authentication protocol to enforce liability,
privacy and revocability in vehicle-generated messages. Underlying is an
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efficient IBGS scheme [Wei05] to avoid the heavy burden of certificate gener-
ation, delivery and verification in a large-scale VANET. The protocol exploits
the features of existing transportation systems to simplify the system admin-
istration overhead.
5.2.1 System set-up
The TEA, e.g., the public security department, generates Υ = (p,G1,G2,
GT , g1, g2, ê) as in Section 3.1. Let u1, u2, u3, u4, u5 be randomly selected
generators of G1. Define cryptographic hash functions HV : {0, 1} → G1,
HO : {0, 1} → G1, HR : {0, 1} → Z∗p, H : {0, 1} → Z∗p. The TEA’s private
key is a randomly chosen value x ∈ Z∗p and its public key is K = gx2 ∈ G2.
Then the public system parameters are
param = (Υ, u1, · · · , u5, HR, HV , HO, H, K)
which can be accessed by each party in the VANET.
5.2.2 Key generation
With this procedure, the TEA generates private keys for the group regis-
tration managers (GRMs), the identity-opening authorities (IOAs) and the
individual vehicles by taking as inputs their public identities.
• On input the identity IDR of a GRM, TEA randomly generates r ∈ Z∗p
and computes
A = gr2, x1 = r + HR(A||IDR)x mod p
Finally GRM gets (x1, A), where A is an auxiliary string that can be
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known by the vehicles in the group, and x1 is the private key of the
GRM.




• On input a vehicle’s identity IDV , TEA uses x to compute the vehicles’s
private key
X = HV (IDV )
x .
5.2.3 Registration to a group
With this procedure, a vehicle with identity IDV can register to one of the
groups IDR in the VANET. Note that the vehicle does not need to contact
the identity-opening authority and the registration procedure is simple.
• The vehicle firstly proves to the GRM that it knows the secret key
X = HV (IDV )
x corresponding to its identity IDV without leaking any
information on X. This can be done with the protocol due to Qin et
al. [Qin09] to guarantee that the vehicle has identity IDV as claimed.
• GRM randomly selects e ∈ Z∗p, and computes
B = (u5/HV (IDV ))
1/(e+x1).
The GRM sends the secret group certificate (B, e, A) to the vehicle via
a confidential channel.
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• The vehicle accepts the certificate if and only if
ê(u5, g2) = ê(B, g2)
eê(B, S)ê(HV (IDV ), g2),
where S = AKHR(A||IDR) = gx12 .
• GRM computes W = ê(HV (IDV ), g2), and records (IDV , B, e, W ) in
its local database.
5.2.4 Authentication of vehicular communications
A registered vehicle IDV in group IDR with secret key X and certificate
(B, e, A) can anonymously sign message m while allowing the identity-opening
authority IOA to open the signature. The detailed instantiation is as follows.
• The vehicle randomly selects s1 ∈ Z∗p , and computes


















• The vehicle randomly selects d ∈ Z∗p and computes





• The vehicle randomly selects r1, r2, r3, r4 ∈ Z∗p, R1, R2, R3 ∈ G1, and
computes
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ρ6 = ê(u3, g2)





ρ8 = ê(HO(IDO), K)
r4 ê(u2, g2)
−r1 .
• The vehicle computes the hash challenge
c = H((σ0, · · · , σ3, σ5)||(ρ0, · · · , ρ8)||A||C1||C2||m).
• The vehicle computes the responses to the hash challenge
z0 = r1 − cs1 mod p,
Z1 = R1X
−c,




z4 = r3 − ce mod p,
z5 = r2 − cs2 mod p,
z6 = r4 − cd mod p.
• The resulting signature σ on message m is:
σ = (σ0, · · · , σ3, σ5)||(z0, Z1, Z2, Z3, z4, z5, z6)||c||A||C1||C2.
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5.2.5 Message verification
Upon receiving a signature σ on message m, the receiver computes
σ4 = ê(σ1, g2)
−1ê(σ2, K)
σ6 = ê(u5, g2)
−1ê(σ2σ5, g2)ê(σ3, S)






























ρ6 = ê(u3, g2)












c = H((σ0, · · · , σ3, σ5)||(ρ0, · · · , ρ8)||A||C1||C2||m) (5.2)
If Equation (5.2) holds, the receiver accepts the message. Else, the mes-
sage is rejected.
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5.2.6 Revoking doubtable messages
If the verifying vehicle receives a message with a valid signature but the
message is doubtable, e.g., a bogus message, the verifier can submit the
message along with its signature to IOA. IOA can use its secret key x0 to
open the encryption in the signature σ. IOA computes
W = ê(HV (IDV ), g2) = C1/ê(x0, C2)
and looks up W in the registration table reg. If no entry W is found, IOA
reports failure for the tracing procedure, else it outputs the vehicle identity
IDV .
Regarding revocation of malicious signers in group signature-based au-
thentication in VANETs, another subtle issue is the case that some signer’s
secret key was compromised (e.g., stolen) for various reasons. It is a known
open problem how to efficiently distinguish the compromised signers in group
signatures. Some proposals suggest a public revocation list (by releasing the
secret signing information of the compromised signer) and, whenever a veri-
fier verifies a vehicular-generated message [Lin07], the verifying vehicle first
checks whether the signer is in the revocation list. If the signer is in the
list, then the message will be discarded. Note that the revocation list grows
linearly after the system is deployed. Hence, the performance of the system
degrades as time passes. Another disadvantage is that one can also determine
the authorship of the messages previously signed by the compromised vehicle.
Hence, the vehicle’s privacy cannot be guaranteed for messages signed before
it was compromised. To mitigate these disadvantages, we suggest that, when
requesting the private key from TEA, each GRM’s identity be appended a
tag specifying the lifetime (e.g., days or weeks) of the GRM’s public key, i.e.,
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(GRM’s identity, lifetime). Before the lifetime expires, each vehicle managed
by this GRM contacts the GRM and updates its secret group signing key (see
Section 5.2.3). For the verifying vehicles, they can just verify the received
message as in Section 5.2.5 by additionally comparing its local time with the
lifetime of the GRM’s public key. This mechanism is very efficient because it
only affects a subgroup of vehicles, i.e., the signing vehicles managed by the
GRM, while the verifying vehicle (which can be any vehicle in the VANET)
will not be affected. After employing this approach, an attacker can only
sign messages on behalf of the compromised vehicles during a short time in-
terval. If the signed message is false and is forwarded to IOA by the receiving
vehicles, the misbehaving compromised vehicle can be located immediately
and stopped by police cars.
5.2.7 Message size
A vehicle-generated message consists of six fields: (Message Type; Payload;
Timestamp; TTL; Group ID; Signature). Message ID defines the message
type, and the payload field may include information on the vehicle’s posi-
tion, direction, speed, traffic events, event time and so on. According to the
DSRC standard [DSRC], the payload of a message is 100 bytes. The times-
tamp specifies the signature generation time, which is used to prevent replay
attacks. It also ensures that an honest vehicle can report the same traffic
situation at different times without being accused of multiple signatures on
the same message. The TTL field is Time To Live and determines how long
the message is allowed to remain in the VANET. Group ID is used to iden-
tify which group the vehicle belongs to. The signature field is the vehicle’s
signature on the first five fields.
We denote the subset of the first five fields by m and the set of all six
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Table 5.1: Format of vehicle-generated messages (suggested field lengths in
bytes)
Mes. Type Payload Timestamp TTL Group ID Sig.
2 100 4 1 2 460
fields1 by M . Table 5.1 specifies the suggested length for each field. The
length of vehicle-generated messages can be expressed as
LM = LMessageType + LPayload + LTimestamp + LTTL + LGroupID + LSignature.
To provide a typical security level of 280, we can set p a 170-bit long prime
and then the element in G1 is 171 bits long [Galb06], and Lsig = 460 bytes.
Thus, from Table 5.1, LM = 2 + 100 + 4 + 1 + 2 + 460 = 569 bytes.
5.2.8 Security analysis
We first analyze liability in our vehicular authentication protocol. The under-
lying IBGS scheme is proven non-frameable under the co-CDH assumption
in (G1,G2) in the sense that no player except the trusted TEA can produce
a signature that can be accepted by the verification procedure and for which
the tracing procedure outputs the identity of a signer who did not generate
the signature, even if the attacking players are allowed to collude [Wei05].
This strong security property guarantees that, if a vehicle does not register
to the VANET, it cannot generate messages accepted by other vehicles, and
no vehicles, IOAs or GRMs can impersonate an innocent registered vehicle
to authenticate vehicular communications. In other words, if a message is
accepted as valid, it must have been generated by a single registered vehi-
cle and not have been tampered with since it was sent. A message which
1It is clear from the context when a message means either the first five fields or all six
fields. We do not insist on this hereafter.
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passes the verification procedure can be used as a convincing argument in
accident investigation if necessary. With this feature, the liability desirable
in VANETs is properly guaranteed.
The underlying IBGS scheme is shown to be anonymous under the DDH
assumption in G1 and the co-DBDH assumption in (G1,G2) [Wei05], even
if there are only two signers in the group. This implies that no one except
the designated IOA can distinguish messages from the various vehicles in
a VANET. Thus an attacker cannot trace the vehicles by monitoring the
communications in the VANET and the identity privacy of vehicles is well
protected.
It is shown that the underlying IBGS is traceable under the k-CAA2 as-
sumption in (G1,G2) and no group member or set of colluding members can
generate a group signature accepted by the verification procedure which is
not linkable to the actual signer [Wei05]. In other words, if a vehicular mes-
sage is accepted, the third-party IOA can always identify the actual message
generator. This fact guarantees that cheating vehicles can always be caught
by revoking their anonymity whenever fraudulent vehicular communications
are detected.
5.3 Improved protocol
In this section, we propose several ways to improve the security and efficiency
of the basic privacy-preserving protocol described in Section 5.2.
5.3.1 Robust key generation
In the basic protocol, a single TEA generates the private keys for all the
parties. If the TEA is compromised, the whole system is jeopardized. Also, if
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the TEA occasionally collapses, then new vehicles cannot join the system. To
address such issues in the implementation, we present a robust key generation
procedure with secret-sharing techniques.
We employ Shamir’s (t, k)-threshold secret sharing scheme [Sham79]. Let
Zp be a finite field with p > k and x ∈ Zp be the secret to be shared. The
master TEA picks a polynomial p(α) of degree at most t − 1 at random,
whose free term is the secret x, that is, p(0) = x. The master TEA sets its
public key as K = gx2 ∈ G2. The polynomial p(α) can be written as





where aj ∈ Zp has been randomly chosen. Each TEAi is assigned a known
index i = 1, · · · , k and the master TEA privately sends to TEAi a share
xi = p(i) and erases x and ai after TEAi receives xi for i = 1, · · · , k. Then
any set A ⊂ {1, · · · , k} of at least t TEAi’s can recover the secret x = p(0)
by interpolating the set of shares they hold















j−i are the Lagrange coefficients.
With the above secret-sharing technique, the set of TEAi’s can jointly
generate keys for each party as follows:




2 , x1,i = ri + HR(A||IDR)xi mod p
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After receiving t pairs (x1,i, Ai) from a set A of at least t TEAi’s, GRM












λix1,i = r + HR(A||IDR)x mod p.
• On input the identity IDO of an IOA, TEAi generates a partial private
key for IOA by computing
x0,i = HO(IDO)
xi .
After receiving partial private keys x0,i from a set A of at least t TEAi’s,






i∈A λixi = HO(IDO)
x.
• On input a vehicle’s identity IDV , TEAi generates a partial private
key for IOA by computing
Xi = HV (IDV )
xi .
After receiving partial private keys Xi from a set A of at least t TEAi’s,




Xiλi = HV (IDV )
P
i∈A λixi = HV (IDV )
x.
In the improved key generation procedure, there exist k TEAs and at
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least t(1 < t < k) of them will distributively generate the private key for each
GRM, IOA and vehicle. The system can work securely even if some TEAs
collapse or are compromised, provided that the number of simultaneously
collapsing or compromised TEAs is at most k− t. These features imply that
the system is robust against accidental failures and malicious attacks.
5.3.2 Emergency message generation
The DSRC standard provides an emergency vehicle subsystem (EVS) which
is the communication lifeline connecting emergency personnel in the field
with emergency dispatch, other emergency personnel, and other resources
that support emergency response [DSRC]. In EVS, the most important issue
is to generate and process emergency messages as fast as possible. We em-
ploy the chameleon hashing technique [Sham01] to accelerate online message
generation. Let ḡ1 = g
ν
1 be a generator of G1 and H̄ : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p be
a regular hash function, where ν is known only by the signer while H̄ can
be publicly shared in the system. For an input (m′, γ′) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × Z∗p, the
chameleon hash CH : {0, 1}∗ × Z∗p → G1 is defined as




With the chameleon hash, a vehicle can generate the authentication message
in its idle time as follows:
• During the offline stage, the vehicle randomly chooses (m′, γ′) ∈ {0, 1}∗×
Z∗p, and computes
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Then the vehicle authenticates m as specified in the basic protocol in
Section 5.2.4, except that the hash challenge should take ḡ1 as a part
of the input:
c = H((σ0, · · · , σ3, σ5)||(ρ0, · · · , ρ8)||A||C1||C2||m||ḡ1).
• In the online stage, if the vehicle has an emergency message m̄ to
announce, it computes
γ̄ = (H̄(m′)− H̄(m̄))ν + γ′ mod p.
Then the vehicle sends ḡ1, m̄, γ̄ and σ to other vehicles for verification.
• Upon receipt of the above data, any other vehicle can compute




and verify (m,σ) as specified in the basic protocol in Section 5.2.5
except that the hash challenge check is updated accordingly as the
following equation
c = H((σ0, · · · , σ3, σ5)||(ρ0, · · · , ρ8)||A||C1||C2||m||ḡ1).
With the above approach, the online stage is very efficient and needs only
two regular hashes, two modular additions and one modular multiplication.
This overhead is almost negligible compared with the exponentiations and
bilinear map computations of the basic protocol. Hence the above protocol
is very suitable for generation of emergency messages.
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5.3.3 Selfish batch verification
To employ the batch verification technique in Section 3.3, the basic group
signature needs to be extended. That is, the extended signature is now
σ′ = σ||(σ4, σ6, σ8)||(ρ0, · · · , ρ8)||S.
Clearly, this modification does not affect any security property of the group
signature because (σ4, σ6, σ8)||(ρ0, · · · , ρ8)||S can be reconstructed from σ
(see Section 5.2.5). The receiving vehicle needs to check Equations (5.1) and
(5.2).
Let the vehicle select n message-signature pairs (mi, σ
′
i) for batch verifi-
cation, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and σ′i = σi||(σ4,i, σ6,i, σ8,i)||(ρ0,i, · · · , ρ8,i)||Si. Then
the vehicle needs to verify the following equations:
σ4,iê(σ1,i, g2)ê(σ
−1
2,i , K) = 1 (5.3)
σ−16,i ê(u
−1





















8,i = 1 (5.7)
σ−18,i C1,iê(σ
−1















2,i = 1 (5.11)
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2,i = 1 (5.14)
S−1i AiK
H(Ai||IDRi ) = 1 (5.15)
and
ci = H((σ0,i, · · · , σ3,i, σ5,i)||(ρ0,i, · · · , ρ8,i)||Ai||C1,i||C2,i||mi).
Note that Equations (5.3) to (5.7), (5.8) to (5.13) and (5.14, 5.15) are in
the same finite cyclic groups GT , G1 and G2, respectively. Then the batch
verification lemma in Section 3.3 can be applied to each of those three batches
of equations. We roughly compare the overheads of individual message veri-
fication with those of batch verification. For n messages, without using the
batch approach, we need O(N) multi-base bilinear map computations and
multi-base exponentiations, as well as n hashes. However, after the batch
verification is applied, the verifying vehicle needs only O(1) multi-base bilin-
ear map computations and multi-base exponentiations, as well as n hashes.
According to state-of-the-art experimental results [Ferr09], a typical bilinear
map takes much longer than one exponentiation in G1, and compared to an
exponentiation, the overhead of a hash computation is negligible. Hence, the
batch approach offers a significant cost reduction and is very useful to speed
up message verifications when the vehicular density is high, as in metropoli-
tan areas.
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In this section, we report on the results of simulations conducted to evaluate
the efficiency, effectiveness and applicability of the proposed scheme with
emergency message generation and selfish message verification. The network
simulator NS-2 [NS2] was used. The VANET scenario was built using the
scenario generator presented by Saha and Johnso [Saha04]. The communi-
cation range was taken from 10 m to 300 m. The road network considered
covered an area of 6.7 × 2.7 km2 and is shown in Figure 5.2. The channel
bandwidth was 6 Mbps and the packet size was 569 bytes. The time-to-live
(TTL) of messages was set to 20 s and the duration of each experiment was
200 s.
The delay introduced by cryptographic operations in the NS-2 simulation
was taken to be the computation times of the cryptographic library MIRACL
[Multiprecision]. When running MIRACL in a PC environment, the times to
compute an exponentiation and a bilinear map are, respectively, about 0.2
ms and 3.5 ms. Hence, in the simulation, we let the batch verification period
range from 10 ms to 60 ms.
An important factor for the performance of the security protocol is the
latency introduced by verifying the messages from other vehicles. Clearly, a
lower latency implies that it takes vehicles less time to respond to the reported
traffic environment changes. In turn, a shorter response time means more
traffic efficiency and less accidents. The average message delay (seconds) is
the average time latency for a message to be processed after it has been sent
from one vehicle to another within a one-hop communication range. The la-
tency must be smaller than the maximum allowable end-to-end transmission
delay [European] because some messages (e.g., those related to serious traffic
jams) need to be forwarded to other vehicles.
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Figure 5.2: Road network considered in the simulation
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Figure 5.3: Impact of authentication on message delay
In Figure 5.3, the average message delay is presented in seconds for differ-
ent batch verification periods τ , traffic densities (vehicles/km2), and message
lifetime TTL = 20 s. One may notice that, given a fixed batch verification
period, the average message delay sharply increases as the vehicle density
grows to about 20 vehicles/km2. After that, the average message delay only
grows very slightly, although vehicles receive an increasing number of mes-
sages to be verified. This is reasonable, since the proposed selfish batch
message verification allows a batch of messages to be verified as if it was a
single message. The average message delay is also affected by the batch ver-
ification period. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, for a fixed vehicle density, the
average message delay increases as the batch verification period increases.
This is because vehicles can only perform the verification procedure after the
current verification period is over. A longer verification period implies that
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Figure 5.4: Impact of authentication on message loss rate
each vehicle spends more time waiting for the next verification period. Note
that the verification period must be at least as long as the time need by a
vehicle to perform a batch verification. We also notice that, with the ex-
periment parameters, the average message delay in all cases is less than 100
ms, which is the suggested maximum message delay in VANETs [European].
This implies that our protocol is effective and applicable in practice.
The average message loss ratio is the average relative frequency of a mes-
sage not being processed before it expires. The average message loss ratio
reflects the applicability of the scheme. If security-related processing intro-
duced substantial message loss, then it would be impractical. Loss occurs
if the message cannot reach its destination or the queue is full because the
message arrival rate is higher than the message processing rate.
In Figure 5.4, the message loss ratio is computed for different verification
periods and vehicle densities. One may observe that the average message loss
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ratio does not always increase as the vehicle density increases. In the case of
normal vehicle density (20 vehicles/km2 or less), the message loss rate is lower
than 30%. Then the loss rate grows quickly up to nearly 50% as the vehicle
density grows to 40 vehicles/km2. After that, the message loss rate does not
grow greatly even if the vehicle density is very high. This is reasonable, as
the large number of messages arrived can be verified as a batch. One may
note that a loss rate approaching 60% only happens when the vehicle density
is also very high. For a heavy traffic load, it is also acceptable if a large
number of messages are lost because most of the messages are repeatedly
sent by vehicles. Hence, the high loss rate in this case may not affect the
applicability of the protocol in practice. Although there exist variations,
the system achieves lower average message loss rate for a shorter verification
period. Since message delay also improved for shorter verification periods,
we can optimize the performance of our authentication protocol by setting
the batch verification period as short as possible, that is, just slightly longer
than the time needed by a vehicle to do a batch verification.
5.5 Summary
The first VANETs are likely to be deployed in urban areas which particularly
suffer from traffic accidents and congestions. In addition to vulnerabilities to
attacks against traffic safety and drivers’ privacy, a large-scale VANET in a
metropolitan area poses a management problem. This section proposes a set
of mechanisms which conciliate efficiency, security and privacy requirements
very well. We exploited an up-to-date cryptographic primitive, i.e. identity-
based group signatures, to divide a large-scale VANET into easy-to-manage
groups and establish liability in vehicular communications while preserving
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 




84 Conciliating Liability and Privacy for Large-Scale VANETs
privacy. We further presented emergency message generation and selfish
batch verification techniques to accelerate message processing in VANETs.
These techniques make our protocol scalable for deployment in big metropoli-
tan areas.
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The signed vehicle-generated messages have to be stored by the receiving
vehicles for possible liability investigation: if some signed messages are later
found to be false and to have misguided other vehicles into accident, the
message generators and endorsers should be traceable. However, vehicular
messages, especially their appended signatures, grow linearly with time while
the storage capacity of OBUs in the vehicles is limited. Therefore, security
and privacy of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications need to be concili-
ated with data aggregation/compression.
Group signatures can be implemented in VANETs to achieve vehicu-
lar communications authentication and vehicle privacy, by letting the trans-
portation office play the role of group manager and vehicles the role of group
members. The main merit of the group signature based technique over the
pseudonym approach is that the former overcomes the limitation of pre-
storing a large number of anonymous certificates. Authentication of vehicular
communications based on group signatures is conceptually simple. However,
85
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group signatures are usually much longer than regular signatures and the
existing secure group signatures do not allow aggregation. If a message is
endorsed by a number of anonymous vehicles, then the same number of group
signatures have to be appended. This causes a heavy communication over-
head for message relay and an expensive storage load for saving witnesses for
the purpose of accident investigation.
The existing proposals for securing VANETs extensively employ crypto-
graphic authentication techniques. A concern that arises from these pro-
posals is how to store a large number of traffic messages, including their
cryptographic signatures, for establishing liability and accident reconstruc-
tion, considering the fact that they grow with time passing and the storage
capacity of vehicles is limited. Another concern is how to verify numerous
cryptographic signatures received by vehicles in case of high traffic density.
This section efficiently addresses these concerns in order to make a high level
of security achievable in VANETs. Our general idea is to aggregate a large
number of signatures into a single one without degrading security. Observing
that most exiting security proposals are suggested in either PKI-based or ID-
based environment, we accordingly provide solutions to aggregate signatures
in PKI-based and ID-based scenarios, respectively.
We notice that our solutions efficiently mitigate the challenges in existing
security approaches to secure VANETs. With our solutions in the PKI sce-
nario, all the received signatures can be aggregated into a single signature on
many messages, much less storage capacity is required and the single signa-
ture can be stored for a long period and later used for liability investigation.
The aggregation requires only multiplications rather than time-consuming
exponentiations or bilinear map computations. In the ID-based scenario, we
partially solved this problem. The aggregated signature can be verified as
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a regular signature. Compared with verifying those signatures one by one,
this enables a significantly faster message response by vehicles. Our analyses
illustrate that our solutions are efficient and practical, especially in the case
of high traffic density in metropolitan areas.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 de-
scribes the security architecture of VANETs, and security requirements and
cryptographic techniques to be applied. We propose our solutions in Sec-
tion 6.2. A comparison of computation and communication efficiency and a
security analysis are reported in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 is a summary.
6.1 Preliminaries
6.1.1 Security architecture of vehicular ad hoc net-
works
Following [Wase08], the VANET architecture is divided into three levels (as
shown in Figure 6.1) in the PKI setting. Level 1 is the vehicle administra-
tion office (VAO); level 2 consists of lower-level vehicle management offices
(LVMO); level 3 includes RSUs and OBUs (or vehicles). VAO is the root
certificate authority (RCA) which generates all the system parameters and
publishes them on its bulletin board. VAO also issues a certificate for each
LVMO, which issues certificates to the RSUs and vehicles in its management
domain.
In the ID-based scenario, the system architecture is divided into two
levels (as shown in Figure 6.2). Level 1 is the vehicle administration office
(VAO); level 2 includes RSUs and OBUs. VAO serves as PKG (public key
generator) in ID-based cryptosystems. It generates all the system parameters
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Figure 6.1: PKI-based system structure model
Figure 6.2: ID-based system structure model
and publishes them. The RSUs and vehicles in the city register to VAO and
get their secret keys from VAO.
In both cases, the communication among RSUs and OBUs (vehicles) fol-
lows the DSRC protocol. Each vehicle has its own ID (e.g. plate number)
or certificate issued by sub vehicle management office (LVMO). Considering
that the presence of RSUs is not pervasive at the beginning of the VANET
deployment stage, we do not place much system management burden on
RSUs. However, with more vehicles joining the VANET, RSUs can take over
some work from VMO or LVMOs to achieve a robust and scalable system.
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6.1.2 Security requirements and challenges
The main thrust behind VANETs is to build a safe and easy driving en-
vironment. The messages transmitted in VANETs must be trustworthy so
that they can guide drivers. If vehicles produce bogus messages for their
own benefit, e.g., clear up the road ahead by broadcasting that the road is in
emergency status due to a sequence of traffic accidents, it must be possible to
catch (later) the fake message originator. In general, it must be possible to
catch the sender of a false message whenever that message causes damage and
liability needs to be investigated. Hence, message authentication, integrity,
and non-repudiation are identified as the primary requirements in VANETs.
As shown in most existing schemes, these security requirements can be met
with cryptographic signatures. However, using cryptographic signatures in
VANETs raises several challenges such as how to distinguish true messages
and react instantly to them, how to compact and store cryptographic traffic
evidence and how to alleviate the conflict between traffic liability and data
storage limitation of the vehicle’s OBU.
6.1.3 Underlying cryptographic technologies
As discussed above, regular signatures suffer from heavy overhead introduced
by signature relay, verification and storage, although they can meet the secu-
rity requirements in VANETs. An alternative might be to use multisignatures
[Bold03, Okam98]. However, a multisignature scheme requires all the signers
to sign the same message, which implies that the vehicles have to interact to
endorse the message. This is somewhat impractical due to high mobility of
vehicles with relative speed up to more than 200 km/h. The extremely short
connection interval among vehicles does not allow them to interactively sign
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a message.
We realize that aggregate signatures [Bone03, Zhan10b] are especially
suitable for securing VANETs. In a cryptographic sense, an aggregate signa-
ture can be thought of as a multisignature without the restriction that the
signed message be the same. It allows many independently generated signa-
tures to be aggregated into a single one. Ideally, the length of the aggregate
signature (excluding the messages and the public keys of the signers) should
be constant, independent of the number of signed messages. The validity of
all the signatures can be verified by merely validating the aggregate signa-
ture. This property matches both the security and efficiency requirements
in VANETs. After a vehicle (or an RSU) receives thousands of message-
signature pairs from other vehicles within its communication range, it can
aggregate all the signatures into a single one, namely an aggregate signature,
and then verify it with one verification operation for all the received signa-
tures. If the verification shows all the signatures are valid, then the vehicle
can make its driving decision and, if necessary, the vehicle (or the RSU)
can forward these messages and the aggregate signature to vehicles nearby.
Finally, the vehicle deletes all the original signatures and just saves the ag-
gregate signature as well as the messages in its onboard storage device. With
this approach, much less bandwidth and storage capacity are consumed, both
of them scarce resources in VANETs.
Boneh et al. presented the first aggregate signature scheme [Bone03],
which is derived from the BLS signature in finite cyclic groups equipped
with efficiently computable bilinear maps. Subsequently, Lysyanskaya et al.
presented a sequential aggregate RSA signature scheme [Lysy04] that, while
more limited, could be instantiated using more general assumptions. In a
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sequential aggregate signature scheme the aggregate signature must be con-
structed sequentially, with each signer modifying the aggregate signature in
turn. Lu et al. presented an aggregate signature scheme [Lu06] that is prov-
ably secure without random oracles. Their signatures are also sequentially
constructed. Unlike in the scheme of Lysyanskaya et al., a verifier need
not know the order in which the aggregate signature was created. How-
ever, in a VANET environment, the messages sent by the vehicles nearby are
random, dynamic and instantaneous; hence, sequential aggregate signatures
[Chen05, Lysy04] are less suitable than non-sequential aggregate signatures.
The above schemes are all in the PKI setting. As for the ID-based
setting, several ID-based aggregate signature schemes have been presented
[Cheo06, Gent06, Herr06, Pate06, Xu05]. Herranz [Herr06] proposed an ID-
based partial aggregate signature with linear size in the number of messages.
Gentry et al. proposed an identity-based aggregate signature [Gent06]. In
their schemes, the verifier does not need to obtain and/or store several signer
public keys; instead, the verifier only needs a description of who signed what,
along with two constant-length “tags”: the short aggregate signature and the
single public key of a private key generator. However, in their scheme, all
signers must use the same (unique) random string w when signing each time.
This limitation makes their scheme impractical for securing VANETs due to
the volatile signature generation-verification relation between vehicles.
6.2 The proposals
We propose vehicular authentication schemes based on aggregate signatures.
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Table 6.1: Format of vehicle-generated message
Emergency Level Payload Timestamp Signature
1 bytes 100 bytes 4 bytes ≤ 128 bytes
6.2.1 High level description of our solutions
The safety-related messages transmitted in VANETs can be sorted according
to their emergency levels. The first level might be about traffic congestion or
accident warning; the second level might be about turning intention, driving
status (e.g., brake, accelerate, wait for traffic light, etc.); and the third level
might be regular reports about location, speed, direction, time, etc. After
the vehicles and RSUs receive lots of messages in one interval, they deal with
them immediately or defer processing some of them according to their level.
After aggregation, the first-level messages are arranged at the top of the list,
in order to ensure a fast propagation of emergency and local warning messages
to the approaching vehicles that is helpful to prevent accidents. The format
of vehicle-generated messages (length in bytes) is shown in Table 6.1. The
payload field may include information on the vehicle’s position, direction,
speed, traffic events, event time and so on. According to DSRC, the payload
of a message is 100 bytes. A timestamp is used to specify the signature
generation time, which is employed to prevent replay attacks.
By taking into account the available up-to-date aggregate signatures and
the number of vehicles and RSUs within communication range, in a small or
medium city we propose to apply PKI-based aggregate signatures, while in
a metropolitan area identity-based aggregate signatures are preferable. ID-
based signatures have the big advantage of eliminating the need for managing
the certifications of a large number of vehicles. In the PKI-based signature
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case, a full aggregate signature [Bone03] is employed, by which all the differ-
ent messages signed by different OBUs and RSUs can be aggregated into a
single signature; consequently, verification can be done as for a single regular
signature and the storage consumption is minimal. In the ID-based signa-
ture case, a partial aggregate signature [Herr06] is employed. Although in
this case the underlying aggregate signature is still partially linear with the
number of the received messages, we relieve this limitation by pre-storing a
part of each signature in vehicles thereby obtaining a constant compressed
signature.
Aggregate signatures in both [Bone03] and [Herr06] rely on the compu-
tational co-Diffie-Hellman assumption in (G1,G2).
6.2.2 Aggregate PKI-based vehicular witnesses
Our scheme uses the property of bilinear maps. The scheme also employs a
full-domain hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The transmitted message is de-
noted by mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ where the first byte represents the message emergency
level. If the message is not traffic-safety related, then its emergency level is
set to 0.
We next apply the BGLS aggregate signature [Bone03] to a medium-scale
VANET. The system architecture is as shown in Figure 6.1. All the entities
including VAO, LVMO, RSUs and OBUs use the BGLS scheme to generate
their public and private key pairs. Since a PKI certificate is in fact the
signature of a message related to identity, time period, public key, etc., we
treat a certificate as a regular message signature. Hence, the certificates can
also be aggregated to save verification time and storage space.
Setup: VAO generates a tuple γ = (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, ê) as in Sec-
tion 3.1 and a hash function H as defined above. The system parameters
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Table 6.2: Format of a certificate: fields and size
Certificate ID Public Key User ID Lifetime Signature
4 bytes 22 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes 22 bytes
are π =< γ, H >. The system parameters are embedded into VAO, LVMO,
RSUs and OBUs.
Key-Certificate Generation: VAO picks a random x ∈ Zp, and com-
putes v = gx2 . VAO’s public key is v ∈ G2 and its secret key is x ∈ Zp.
The LVMO can freely choose their public and private key similarly as VAO
does, and then run a zero-knowledge proof protocol [Qin09] with VAO to
prove their public key binding with their private key and get a certificate
from VAO. VAO generates the certificate on each LVMO’s public key with x.
Similarly, OBU (or RSU) generates its secret key and public key; each LVMO
generates certificates for RSUs and OBUs within its management domain.
The format of a certificate is shown in Table 6.2.
Signing: The format of the message mi is (ELevel, MPayload) where
ELevel denotes the the emergency level of the message and MPayload is the
message payload. Assume that a vehicle has public key vi = g
xi
2 and secret
key x ∈ Zp, and it wants to send a message mi. It computes hi = H(mi)
and σi = h
xi
i . The signature on mi is σ ∈ G1. Then the vehicle outputs a
vehicular message Mi = (mi, σi, certificate). Note that the certificate can
be viewed as a signature σi′ on a message mi′ of the first four fields in the
certificate. Hence, we can view a vehicular message Mi = (mi, σi,mi′ , σi′) as
two regular BLS message-signature pairs. Notice here that we neglect the
certificates of LVMOs as the few LVMOs are static and their certificates can
be verified separately and cached during their lifetime.
Aggregation and verification: For clarity, we assume that only the
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OBUs or vehicles will verify, store and relay the vehicular messages. However,
our description easily extends to RSUs. Before aggregation, a vehicle first
checks that the received vehicular messages are of the correct format, and
discard the incorrect ones. Vehicular messages are classified according to
their emergency level. Emergency messages will be aggregated and verified
upon their arrival. Then the vehicle aggregates and verifies the second-level
messages and finally the third-level ones. For each class of vehicular messages,





as the aggregate signature on the received n messages Mi of the same emer-




ê(hi, vi)ê(hi′ , vi′).
Finally, the vehicle adds Mi to its local database
M = (m1||...||mi−1; σ0 · · ·σi−1; m0′||...||m(i−1)′ ; σ0′ · · ·σ(i−1)′).
We note that the second and fourth fields are always of constant size, 22 bytes
for each field in the above proposal. The saving in storage cost is significant.
The following measures can further improve the proposal. If a vehicle
receives many signatures from a second vehicle (which is possible when they
both move in the same direction), the sender’s certificate needs to be veri-
fied only in the first aggregation and then cached for other signatures. To
avoid verifying duplicate messages, a vehicle can check the first field of its
local database M. The vehicle only needs to store one copy of the duplicate
messages from OBUs. If the duplicate messages are from the same OBU,
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the vehicle discards them directly. Finally, when aggregation verification has
failed, we can use the “divide-and-conquer” search algorithm in [Matt09] to
identify the invalid signatures.
The underlying aggregate signature is shown in [Bone03] to be correct and
secure against existential forgery in the aggregate chosen-key model. Cor-
rectness implies that the messages generated by vehicles honestly following
the protocol will always be accepted. If the aggregate signature on received
vehicular messages is valid, then all the received vehicular messages can be
viewed as valid to guide vehicles. Unforgeability guarantees that, if a vehi-
cle does not register to the VANET, it cannot generate aggregate message
signatures accepted by other vehicles, even if the cheating vehicle is allowed
to access valid message signatures over the VANET. If an aggregate mes-
sage signature passes the verification procedure, it must be on intact fresh
messages generated by registered vehicles. This implies that the attacker
cannot cheat other vehicles by forging a new valid message or by modify-
ing an existing valid message or by replaying a once valid but now expired
message. Unforgeability also implies that, if the aggregate signature on a
number of vehicular messages is accepted by the verification procedure, then
all the message originators indicated by their certificates must be responsible
for these messages. This is because if not all the originators endorsed the
message, then the aggregate signature could not be valid; otherwise unforge-
ability would be contradicted. Hence, liability can be established via the
aggregate signature.
6.2.3 Aggregate ID-based traffic witnesses
When PKI-based aggregate signatures are employed for large-scale VANETs,
the overhead of certificate management (issuing, distributing, revoking and
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retrieving certificates) becomes a heavy burden, even with full aggregation.
In this case, the ID-based aggregate signature in [Herr06] is preferable. The
resulting system architecture is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Here, VAO works
as a trusted PKG.
Setup: VAO generates a tuple γ = (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, ê). Here, G1 =
G2 = G and g1 = g2 = g. Two hash functions are selected: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G. The system parameters π =< λ, γ, H1, H2 > are
embedded into VAO, RSUs and OBUs.
Key Generation: Let N be the maximum number of nodes including
RSUs and OBUs in a VANET. VAO randomly selects ri ∈ Z∗p and computes
Ri = g
ri for i = 1, · · · , N . VAO also randomly chooses an element x ∈ Z∗p
and computes Y = gx. VAO’s secret master key is set as (x, r1, · · · , rN).
VAO’s public key is (Y, R1, · · · , Rn) which can also be embedded into VAO,
RSUs and OBUs. For a large-scale VANET up to one million nodes, the size
of the system public key is only 22 Mbytes, which is affordable in practice.
An OBU or a vehicle registers to VAO with an identity IDi. By comput-
ing a Schnorr signature on the message ID, VAO generates the private key
for the vehicle as follows:
1. VAO looks up ri ∈ Z∗p in its private key list and Ri = gri in its public
key list;
2. VAO computes the value σi = ri + xH1(IDi, Ri) mod p;
3. VAO privately sends the secret key σi to the OBU (or RSU) through a
confidential channel;
4. The OBU (or RSU) can verify the correctness of the received secret
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Signing: Let a vehicle hold identity IDi and secret key σi. When it wants
to endorse a message mi, it computes θ = H2(mi, ID)
σi as the resulting
signature on mi. The vehicle sends the endorsed vehicular message Mi =
(mi, IDi, θi) to other vehicles nearby.
Aggregation and verification: The vehicular messages can be pro-
cessed similarly to those in the previous PKI-based solution, according to
their emergency level. Assume that a vehicle receives n vehicular messages
Mi = (mi, IDi, θi) to be verified in an interval, where one can have IDi = IDj










ê(H2(IDi,mi), Ri · Y H1(IDi,Ri)).
Finally, the vehicle adds Mi to its local database
M = (m1||...||mi−1; ID1|| · · · ||IDi−1; θ1 · · · θi−1),
One may note that the last field is always of constant size, i.e., 22 bytes in
the above proposal. The saving in storage cost is significant.
The correctness of the protocol is straightforward to verify. This means
that the aggregate signature will be accepted if all the messages are gener-
ated by honestly following the protocol. If the aggregate signature on the
received messages is viewed as valid after verification, then all the messages
can be trusted to guide vehicles, which potentially improves traffic safety
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Table 6.3: Comparison of verification and storage
Verification cost Signature size (bytes)
PKIBA 2nE + 4nP 44n
PKIAA 2nE + nM + (2n + 1)P 44
IDBA 2nE + 2nP 22n
IDAA 2nE + nM + (n + 1)P 22
and efficiency. As for security, it has been shown that, in the random ora-
cle model [Bell93], the underlying aggregate signature is unforgeable under
adaptive chosen-message attacks. This guarantees that, if a vehicle does not
register to the VANET, it cannot generate message signatures accepted by
other vehicles in the aggregate-verification procedure, even if the cheating
vehicle is allowed to access valid messages signatures over the VANET. If an
aggregate signature passes the verification procedure, it must be a signature
on intact fresh messages generated by registered vehicles. An attacker can-
not cheat other vehicles by forging a new valid message or by modifying an
existing valid message or by replaying a once valid but now expired message.
Hence, if the verification of the aggregate signature on stored messages shows
that all the messages are valid but, later on, some of them are found to be
deceitful, then the originators or endorsers of these messages can be traced
by their identities for liability. This is essential to guarantee trustworthiness
in vehicular communications.
6.3 Performance evaluation
We briefly evaluate the performance of our approaches. To assess the cost
savings, we compare the verification cost and signature size with aggregation
and without aggregation in Table 6.3.
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In the above table, PKIBA denotes PKI-based authentication using the
scheme in Section 6.2.2 without aggregation while PKIAA is the scheme in
that section with aggregation. Similarly, IDBA and IDAA are ID-based au-
thentication without/with the aggregation technique in Section 6.2.3. The
number of messages is n, while M , E, and P are, respectively, the multi-
plication, exponentiation and bilinear map operations; for clarity, we do not
differentiate those operations for different groups. Also, we view the hash to
G1 (or G) as one exponentiation but we consider the hash to Z∗p as negligible,
compared to other operations. Among all the operations, the bilinear map
is most expensive and then comes the exponentiation.
From the above table, the saving in storing cryptographic signatures is
very impressive as signatures growing linearly with time are compressed into
constant length. This is very critical if a large number of signatures have
to be stored for a long period for the purpose of liability investigation. As
to computation cost, the verification overhead after aggregation is about
half of that without aggregation. Computation savings seem less impressive
than storage savings. However, one may further note that the aggregation
verification allows the use of fast multi-bilinear map computation techniques.
In practice, the actual improvement in signature verification should be much
more than twofold. This is also important to enable vehicles to react to
emergency messages as soon as possible.
6.4 Summary
This chapter proposed efficient authentication protocols for securing VANETs.
Proposals were made for the PKI-based and ID-based scenarios. In both
cases, the signatures are compressed into constant size and much storage
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space is saved in the vehicle onboard device. The proposals also allow
fast message verification to speed up vehicle response to traffic environment
changes.
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Based Services in VANETs
In addition to safety-related applications, VANETs will enable a broad range
of value-added applications, like payment services (toll collection, parking
fee collection), location based services (LBSs, e.g., to locate the closest fuel
station), infotainment [Tell08], etc. It is expected that those value-added ap-
plications of VANETs will open substantial business opportunities [Car2car].
Security and privacy are two critical concerns in VANETs. In traditional
wired networks, sophisticated cryptographic technologies have been devel-
oped to protect parties in value-added applications (mainly location based
services); examples of such technologies are anonymous credential systems,
First Virtual, SSL, iKP secure electronic payments [Bell00] and the SET
protocol [Mastercard]. However, VANETs are very dynamic and their com-
munications are volatile, which makes the aforementioned complex protocols
unsuitable.
LBS applications raise additional challenges in VANETs. A way to achieve
security in a VANET is for any message broadcast by a vehicle to contain a
103
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verifiable identity as well as authentic data. However, in that case, messages
broadcast can reveal the originating vehicle’s identity as well as its location,
which facilitates abuses consisting of tracking the movement of the vehicle by
linking its traversed locations. Such tracking may be useful not only for ter-
rorists to monitor a target vehicle, but also for LBS applications accessed by
the vehicle to profile the locations of the vehicle user, which enables inference
of personal interests and thus encroaches on the user’s privacy [Pool09].
In this chapter, we investigate the security requirements of LBS in VANETs
and propose a new privacy-preserving LBS scheme for those networks. The
new proposal integrates an identity-based cryptosystem (Section 7.1.3) and
group signatures (Section 7.1.4). In our scheme, the public keys of an RSU
and an LBS provider are just their identities. On the vehicle side, only
a member key is needed which is used to generate authenticated data to
access LBSs. This eliminates the certificate management overhead. Further-
more, our system does not need to maintain groups in dynamic networks
with volatile connections. Instead, we exploit group signatures to protect
the vehicle privacy. Hence, our system is robust because it does not depend
on an instable proxy. Finally, with our scalable hierarchical technique, the
proposed system maintains efficiency even if the system hosts a huge number
of LBS users.
The chapter is organized in the following way. In Section 7.1, we discuss
some preliminaries, including the system architecture, the security require-
ments, identity-based cryptography, group signature and bilinear maps. Sec-
tion 7.2 proposes our basic LBS scheme. We evaluate the new protocol in
Section 7.3. Section 7.4 develops an improved LBS System. Section 7.5 is a
concluding summary.
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Figure 7.1: System architecture
7.1 Preliminaries
7.1.1 System architecture
The system architecture is illustrated in Figure 7.1. In the system, there are
key generation center(s) (KGC(s)), RSUs, vehicles and providers of location
based services (LBS providers):
• A KGC is a trusted third party. It generates private keys for vehicles
and LBS providers and it issues secret member keys for vehicles. In
addition, the KGC is assumed to be able to determine the real identity
of vehicles and LBS providers.
• RSUs are equipped with on-board sensory, processing, and wireless
communication modules, and they are distributed along the road side.
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They are connected to LBS providers by a wired network. RSUs are
assumed to be semi-trusted (i.e., some of them might be compromised).
• Vehicles move along the roads, sharing environmental information with
each other and/or querying LBSs through RSUs using the DSRC pro-
tocol [DSRC]. Each vehicle is equipped with on-board sensory, pro-
cessing, and wireless communication modules.
• LBS providers process the data forwarded by RSUs and offer LBSs to
vehicles.
7.1.2 Security requirements
We analyze the security requirements of an LBS system in a VANET. We
first show the communication model of an LBS protocol. As illustrated in
Figure 7.1, an LBS protocol can be described in three steps. In the first
step, a vehicle sends its request to a nearby RSU using the DSRC protocol
in a single-hop or multi-hop manner. In the second step, the RSU receives
the request from the vehicle and detects what kind of services the vehicle is
asking for; then it forwards the request to the corresponding LBS provider.
In the last step, the LBS provider authenticates the vehicle. If the vehicle is
a subscriber, the LBS provider returns the requested service to the vehicle by
routing its response through RSUs neighboring the RSU the vehicle request
came from.
[Security requirements at Step 1]
In this step the security requirements are:
• Message confidentiality. An LBS request may contain sensitive in-
formation of a vehicle. For instance, if a vehicle requests a priced ser-
vice, the e-cash (usually a blind signature [Chau82, Chen09, Zhan09c])
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may be included in the query. If the vehicle sends this request to the
LBS provider through an RSU, anyone can learn the e-cash information
and an attacker can steal the e-cash by disabling the communication
from the requesting vehicle to the RSU. Hence, message confidentiality
is required. Message confidentiality at this step has two levels. Level
1 provides confidentiality when the attacker does not know the private
key of the RSU. It requires that only the vehicle and the RSU be aware
of the information exchange. Level 2 provides confidentiality even if
the attacker learns the private key of the RSU. In this case, we require
that no one but the vehicle and the designated LBS provider can learn
the content of the LBS request.
• Vehicle privacy. Privacy in this step has also two levels. Level 1
guarantees privacy when the attacker does not know the private key
of the RSU. It requires that it be computationally hard for everyone
(except the message generator or some trusted third party) to decide
whether two different messages were generated by the same vehicle.
Level 2 guarantees privacy even when an RSU is compromised by an
attacker. In this case, we require that the attacker can only learn the
service type a vehicle is requesting.
[Security requirements at Step 2]
In our system, an RSU serves as a router. For an LBS protocol in
VANETs, an RSU only needs to know the service type that a vehicle is re-
questing so that it can forward the request to the right LBS provider. Hence,
in our design, we only let RSUs learn the kind of service the vehicle wants
to access. This step needs to meet the following security requirements:
• Message confidentiality. No one but the vehicle and the designated
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LBS provider can learn the content of the message forwarded by the
RSU.
• Vehicle privacy. It is computationally hard for everyone (except the
message generator or some trusted third party) to decide whether two
different messages were generated by the same vehicle.
[Security requirements at Step 3]
This step has the following requirements:
• Vehicle authentication. The LBS provider must be sure that the
request comes from some registered vehicle, i.e., a subscriber.
• Vehicle privacy. The LBS provider only learns that a vehicle is query-
ihg the LBS but it cannot learn the vehicle’s identity. Furthermore, the
LBS provider cannot decide whether two different requests were gener-
ated by the same vehicle.
• Vehicle traceability. In VANETs, the privacy of a vehicle should
be conditional. That is, if necessary, some trusted third party should
be able to revoke the anonymity of doubtable vehicles. Otherwise, a
malicious vehicle might send fake messages to jeopardize the system
without fear of being caught. KGC is endowed with the ability to trace
the real identity of dishonest vehicles sending fake messages to LBS
providers in order to disrupt services.
7.1.3 Identity-based encryption
In our protocol, we will use an Identity-Based Cryptosystem (IBC) to guar-
antee the security of the system. In VANETs, since we need not consider the
privacy of RSUs and LBS providers, we can use the location information and
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service type as the identity of an RSU (and LBS provider). For instance, if an
RSU is located at street A in city B, then we can use ‘RSU, streetA, cityB’
as the identity of this RSU; for an LBS provider who provides online map
service in city B, we can use ‘onlinemap, cityB’ as the identity of the LBS
provider. Furthermore, in our system, a trusted third party, called the Key
Generation Center (KGC), generates the corresponding private keys for the
entities in IBC. To operate, the KGC first publishes the system parameters
and keeps secret the corresponding master key. Given the system parame-
ters, any party can compute the public key corresponding to an identity ID
by combining the system parameters with the identity value. To obtain a
corresponding private key, the party authorized to use identity ID contacts
the KGC, and the KGC uses the master key to generate the private key for
identity ID.
7.1.4 Group signatures with verifier-local revocation
Group signatures [Bone04b, Chau91] allow the members of a group to sign
on behalf of the group. Everyone can verify the signature with a group
public key while no one can know the identity of the signer except the group
manager. Further, except for the opener, it is computationally hard for
anyone to decide whether two different signatures were issued by the same
group member.
Member revocation is needed to disable members who left the group or
whose secret member key and/or member certificate were/was compromised.
Most group signatures suffer from inefficient member revocation.
Recently, an efficient approach to membership revocation in group sig-
natures was proposed, called verifier-local revocation [Bone04a]. The idea is
that only verifiers are involved in the revocation mechanism, while signers
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have no involvement. This approach is especially suitable for mobile envi-
ronments where mobile signers (i.e., the vehicles in our case) have much less
computational power than the verifying servers (i.e., the LBS providers).
We will use the group signature scheme with optimized verifier-local re-
vocation in [Naka05] to achieve ‘Vehicle Authentication’, ‘Vehicle Privacy’
and ‘Vehicle Traceability’.
7.2 Privacy-preserving LBS proposal
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving LBS scheme for VANETs.
Before describing the scheme in detail, we first explain the notations used to
simplify the description.
Table 7.1: Description of notation
Notation Description
V : A vehicle.
R: An RSU.
L: An LBS provider.
IDA: The identity of entity A.
SA: The secret key of A.
||: Message concatenation operation.
Des: The description of an LBS request.
Add: The addresses of some RSUs near R through which the LBS
response to V will be routed.
TP : A time stamp.
IEK: The identity enrolment key, used to generate private keys for
RSUs and LBS providers.
MEK: The member enrolment key, used to issue member keys for
vehicles.
EK(·)/DK(·): A symmetric-key encryption scheme (e.g., AES).
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Figure 7.2: The LBS protocol
7.2.1 High level description
This section outlines the basic ideas of our LBS system for application in
VANETs. We refer to the three steps mentioned in Section 7.1.2 and shown
in Figure 7.2.
In the first step, the vehicle V first prepares a request of the form Des||
Add||TP ||Sig and encrypts this request under L’s identity to generate a ci-
phertext cipher1, where Sig is the group signature with verifier-local revoca-
tion on Des||Add||TP . Then it encrypts TP ||IDL||cipher1 under the identity
of its nearby RSU to generate the ciphertext cipher2. Finally, cipher2 is sent
to the RSU.
In the second step, when the RSU receives cipher2 from V , RSU decrypts
the ciphertext cipher2 to get TP ||IDL||cipher1. If TP is fresh, RSU forwards
cipher1 to the LBS provider with identity IDL.
In the last step, the LBS provider decrypts the ciphertext cipher1 to get
Des||Add||TP ||Sig. It then checks whether TP is fresh and Sig is a valid
signature on Des||Add||TP . If TP is fresh and Sig is valid, the LBS provider
provides the service described by Des to Add.
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7.2.2 The concrete scheme
In this section, we propose our concrete LBS scheme, consisting of the fol-
lowing five stages.
[System Setup]
At this stage, KGC initializes the system-wide parameters. It does the
following.
1. Generate a tuple (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, ê). Here, G1 = G2 = G and
g1 = g2 = g.
2. Choose u0, u1 ∈ G.
3. Pick κ, ρ ∈ Z∗p as its master secret key, and compute u2 = gκ, u3 = gρ





Y0 = ê(u0, u3)
Y1 = ê(u0, g)
Y2 = ê(u1, g)
Y3 = ê(g, g).
5. Choose a symmetric-key encryption scheme EK(.)/DK(.). We assume
that the bit-length of K is λ.
6. Select cryptographic hash functions H0(·) : {0, 1}∗ −→ G, H1(·) :
{0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗p and H2(·) : GT −→ {0, 1}λ.
7. Publish the system parameters as
Ψ = (ê, p,G,GT , g, u0, u1, u2, u3, H0, H1, H2, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3, EK(·)/DK(·)).
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Ψ is assumed to be pre-loaded in each vehicle, RSU and LBS provider.
The KGC also maintains a member list ML and a revocation list RL,
where ML is kept secret while RL is published. We will define these lists
later.
[Registration]
Before a vehicle, an LBS provider or an RSU joins a VANET, it registers
with the KGC. The KGC generates a secret key or a member key for them
using the following algorithms.
RSUJoin: This algorithm is used to generate the secret key for an RSU.
Suppose that the identity of an RSU Ri is IDRi . The KGC computes SRi =
H0(IDRi)
κ.
ServiceJoin: This algorithm is used to generate the secret key for an LBS
provider. Suppose that the identity of an LBS provider is IDLi . The KGC
computes SLi = H0(IDLi)
κ.
VehicleJoin: This algorithm is used to generate the member key for a
vehicle. The KGC maintains a member list ML of tuples (IDV , w, x, v),
where v = ux1 . When a vehicle wants to join the system, the KGC accepts a
vehicle’s identity IDVi and generates the member key as follows.
1. Select xi ∈ Z∗p.
2. Compute wi = g
1/(ρ+xi) and set (wi, xi) as the member key of Vi.
3. Add (IDVi , wi, xi, vi) to ML, where vi = u
xi
1 is the revocation token of
Vi.
[LBS Protocol]
As discussed in Section 7.1.2, an LBS protocol consists of three steps.
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Step 1: The first step is the vehicle-to-RSU communication. Suppose
that Vi wants to access the LBS provider Lk and its nearby RSU is Rj. Vi
does the following:
1. Choose s ∈ Z∗p and compute
C1 = g
s, SK1 = H2(ê(u
s
2H0(IDLk)))
where SK1 will be the key of the symmetric-key encryption scheme
EK(·)/DK(·).
2. Set m1 = Des||Add||TP ||Sig, and compute C2 = ESK1(m1), where Sig
is the signature on m0 = Des||Add||TP which is generated using the
SigGen algorithm in Figure 7.3.
3. Choose t ∈ Z∗p and compute
C3 = g
t, SK2 = H2(ê(u
t
2, H0(IDRj))).
4. Set cipher1 = C1||C2, m2 = TP ||IDLk ||cipher1.
5. Compute C4 = ESK2(m2).
6. Send cipher2 = (C3||C4) to Rj.
Step 2: When Rj receives cipher2 = (C3, C4), it does the following:
1. Compute SK2 = H2(ê(C3, SRj)).
2. Compute m2 = TP ||IDLk ||cipher1 = DSK2(C4).
3. Check TP to decide whether the request is fresh. If it is, send cipher1 =
(C1, C2) to Lk; otherwise abort.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 




7.2 Privacy-preserving LBS proposal 115
1. Randomly select α, β, γ ∈ Z∗p and compute δ =
xiα, ζ = xiβ, η = xiγ.
2. Compute t1 = wiu
α
0 , t2 = g































5. Compute c = H1(Ψ,m0, t1, t2, T3, t4, R1, ..., R6).
6. Compute sα = rα+cα, sβ = rβ+cβ, sγ = rγ+cγ,
sxi = rxi + cxi, sδ = rδ − cδ, sζ = rζ + cζ and
sη = rη + cη.
7. Output the group signature Sig =
(t1, t2, T3, t4, c, sα, sβ, sγ, sxi , sδ, sζ , sη).
Figure 7.3: The group signature generation algorithm SigGen
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R3 = ê(t1, g




















= H1(Ψ,m0, t1, t2, T3, t4, R1, ..., R6).
3. Output valid if the signature passes the above
check.
Figure 7.4: The group signature verification algorithm SigVer
Step 3: When Lk receives cipher1 = (C1, C2), it does the following:
1. Compute SK1 = H2(ê(C1, SLk)).
2. Compute m1 = Des||Add||TP ||Sig = DSK1(C2). If TP is fresh, go to
next step; otherwise, abort.
3. Extract Sig = (t1, t2, T3, t4, sα, sβ, sγ, sxi , sδ, sζ , sη).
4. Check whether Sig is a valid group signature on Des||Add||TP using
the SigVer algorithm in Figure 7.4. If the signature is valid, provide
the service to Add according to Des1.
[Revocation]
Two mechanisms are suggested to tackle the revocation problem. Firstly,
the KGC maintains a revocation list RL. Under normal circumstances, when a
1In Des, an AES key can be included, so that the outcome could be broadcasted by
the LBS provider in encrypted form under that AES key.
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vehicle Vi is compromised, the KGC first finds the corresponding (IDVi , wi, xi,
vi) in ML and then adds vi to the revocation list RL. To detect whether a
group signature Sig = (t1, t2, T3, t4, sα, sβ, sγ, sxi , sδ, sζ , sη) is generated by a
revoked vehicle, the LBS provider checks T3
?
= ê(t4, vj) for all vj ∈ RL. If
none of the equations holds, it means that the vehicle is not revoked. Sec-
ondly, when there are too many revoked vehicles in RL, we may allow the
KGC to choose a threshold τ ; and when the number of revoked vehicles in
RL is greater than τ , the KGC updates its MEK and corresponding public
key, and re-issues member keys for all the vehicles. This mechanism gives a
trade-off between revocation checks by LBS providers and key updates for
entities in a VANET. The key updates may cause heavy overhead in case of
a very large-scale VANET. In Section 7.4, we further propose a hierarchical
approach to alleviate the overhead so that the system can stay efficient even
if the VANET hosts a large number of vehicles.
[Trace]
Let Sig = (t1, t2, T3, t4, sα, sβ, sγ, sxi , sδ, sζ , sη) be a valid group signature.
To trace a vehicle, the KGC checks T3
?
= ê(t4, vi) for the tuple (IDVi , wi, xi, vi)
on ML. If this equation holds, KGC outputs IDVi .
7.3 Evaluation
7.3.1 Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the LBS protocol. The following
analysis shows that the proposal meets all the security requirements described
in Section 7.1.2.
First, we show that the message confidentiality and the vehicle privacy of
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 




118 Privacy-Preserving Location Based Services in VANETs
Step 1 are satisfied.
• Level 1 message confidentiality and vehicle privacy. At this step, the
ciphertext cipher2 is generated by using the basic identity-based en-
cryption (IBE) scheme which was proven secure by Boneh and Franklin
[Bone01b]. Therefore, level 1 message confidentiality naturally follows.
Furthermore, in each session of the protocol, a random value t is cho-
sen. Therefore, in each session, C3 and C4 are different and independent
from those in other sessions.
• Level 2 message confidentiality and vehicle privacy. In our protocol, the
content of the LBS request is encrypted under the LBS provider’s iden-
tity in cipher1 using the Boneh and Franklin IBE scheme [Bone01b].
Only the designated LBS provider owns the secret key corresponding to
this identity. Hence, even if the private key of the RSU is leaked to the
attacker, no one except the vehicle and the designated LBS provider
can read the content of the LBS request. Furthermore, in each session
of the protocol, a random value s is chosen. Therefore, in each ses-
sion, C1 and C2 are also different and independent from those in other
sessions.
In Step 2, the RSU can decrypt cipher2 to get TP ||IDLk ||cipher1. From
IDLk , the RSU can learn what kind of service the vehicle wants to access.
However, since the RSU does not know the private key of the LBS provider,
it cannot learn the content of cipher1. Therefore, message confidentiality for
this step is met. Furthermore, cipher1 is also generated under the Boneh and
Franklin IBE scheme. Vehicle privacy for this step accordingly follows.
Finally, we show that our protocol meets vehicle authentication, vehi-
cle privacy and vehicle traceability of Step 3 as defined in Section 7.1.2.
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In this step, the LBS provider first decrypts the ciphertext cipher1 to get
Des||Add||TP ||Sig. If Sig is a valid group signature, then the LBS provider
is sure that the request comes from a registered vehicle. Hence, vehicle au-
thentication is satisfied. Furthermore, the KGC can recover the identity of
the vehicle, so vehicle traceability is satisfied. As to vehicle privacy, since
anyone can generate Des||Add||TP , it is easy to see that Des||Add||TP may
not help the LBS provider to trace a vehicle. It remains Sig for the LBS
provider to trace a vehicle. However, the group signature with verifier-local
revocation has the property that it is computationally hard for anyone but
the trusted third party (KGC in our scheme) to decide whether two different
signatures were issued by the same member. Hence, Sig cannot help the
LBS provider to trace a vehicle.
7.3.2 Transmission overhead
In this section, we examine the transmission delay incurred by the security
and privacy mechanism. We will only deal with the delay in Step 1, which
has a relatively crucial bandwidth limitation2.
From our LBS protocol, it is easy to see that the length of an LBS request
is equal to the length of C3||TP ||IDL||C1||Des||Add||TP ||Sig in Step 1. Ex-
cluding Des||Add3, it remains to evaluate the length of C3||TP ||IDL||C1||
TP ||Sig. According to [Bone01a] and [Naka05], the length of a point in G
and the length of Sig are 171 bits (about 22 bytes) and 362 bytes respec-
tively. In addition, the length of TP is 4 bytes and the length of IDL is 20
bytes. Hence, the length of C3||TP ||IDL||C1||TP ||Sig is about 434 bytes.
2For Step 2 and 3, since we assume RSUs are connected to LBS providers by a wired
network, the delay in these steps is much smaller than that in Step 1.
3These data are required even without any security and privacy mechanism. It is clearer
to evaluate the cryptographic overhead without considering these data.
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According to DSRC [DSRC], the minimal data rate in DSRC is 6 Mbps.
Hence, we have that the maximal transmission delay caused by the security
and privacy mechanism at Step 1 is 434×8
6×1024×1024 s ≈ 0.55 ms. This delay is
very low for vehicles in VANETs.
7.3.3 Computational overhead
This section discusses the computational overhead at each step in our proto-
col. In the sequel, we will only consider the costly operations (i.e. bilinear
map and point exponentiation operations). According to the execution time
results shown in [Jian09], the measured processing time4 for one bilinear
map operation is about 1.87 ms and the time for one point exponentiation
operation is about 0.49 ms.
At the first step, we notice that all point exponentiation operations can
be pre-computed off-line. Therefore, this step only needs to compute two
bilinear map operations on-line. The time is about 3.74 ms.
At the second step, an RSU only needs to compute one bilinear map
operation to decrypt the ciphertext cipher2. The time is about 1.87 ms.
For the last step, the LBS provider needs to calculate 17 point exponen-
tiation operations and 2 bilinear map operations. The total time is about
12.07 ms.
Therefore, the total computational overhead at all the steps is about 17.68
ms. This is affordable for vehicles wishing to access LBS.
4For a super singular curve of embedded degree k = 6 over F397 with a C program on
an Intel CoreTM 2 Duo 2.0GHz Linux machine.
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Figure 7.5: Hierarchical KGC and multi-issue Key
7.4 Hierarchical KGC and multi-issue key
In our basic system, we use a single KGC to generate private keys for RSUs
and LBS providers, and issue member keys for vehicles. However, if there is
a huge number of users in a VANET, the KGC may become a bottleneck:
the KGC needs not only to generate private keys or member keys for a large
number of users, but also to verify the identities of the users. Furthermore,
as the number of vehicles in the revocation list grows, the performance of
the system might decline. To let the system remain efficient even if a large
number of vehicles are revoked, we introduce an approach referred to as hier-
archical KGC and multi-issue key (HKMK). The idea of HKMK is illustrated
in Figure 7.5.
In this approach, we use a two-level hierarchical KGC. A root KGC is
used to issue certificates for low-level KGCs. As in our basic system, each
low-level KGC has a single identity enrolment key (IEK) which is used to
generate private keys for RSUs and LBS providers. However, unlike in our
basic system, each low-level KGC has n different member enrolment keys
(MEKs). When a vehicle joins the system, the low-level KGC randomly
chooses one of its MEKs and generates a member key for this vehicle. In
this way, vehicles in a domain are separated into n sub-groups and, when
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a vehicle contacts an LBS provider for the LBS, the LBS provider can only
learn that the vehicle belongs to a sub-group.
In what follows, we show how to set up the system parameters in the
System Setup stage. We reformulate this stage into two sub-stages: Root
KGC Setup and Low-Level KGC Setup. The description of each sub-stage
comes as follows.
[Root KGC Setup]
At this stage, the root KGC initializes the system-wide parameters. It
does the following:
1. Choose a cyclic group G and a cyclic multiplicative group GT of the
same order p, so that there exists a bilinear map ê : G × G → GT ,
where G is generated by g.




Y1 = ê(u0, g)
Y2 = ê(u1, g)
Y3 = ê(g, g).
3. Choose a symmetric-key encryption scheme EK(·)/DK(·).
4. Select cryptographic hash functions H0(·) : {0, 1}∗ −→ G, H1(·) :
{0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗p and H2(·) : GT −→ {0, 1}λ.
5. Publish the system-wide parameters
Ψ = (ê, p,G,GT , g, u0, u1, H0, H1, H2, Y1, Y2, Y3, EK(·)/DK(·)).
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Ψ is assumed to be pre-loaded in each low-level KGC, vehicle, RSU
and LBS provider.
One may notice that the root KGC no longer needs to maintain a revo-
cation list with the revocation tokens of the vehicles. Instead, the low-level
KGCs will maintain their respective revocation lists.
[Low-Level KGC Setup]
After seeing the system-wide parameters, a low-level KGC generates its
own parameters as follows:
1. Pick κ ∈ Z∗p as its identity enrolment key (IEK) and n member enrol-
ment keys (MEKs) ρ1, ..., ρn ∈ Z∗p.
2. Compute u2 = g
κ and u3i = g
ρi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n as its master public key.
3. Compute Y0i = ê(u0, u3i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4. Publish the parameters as
Ω = (u2, u31, ..., u3n, Y01, ..., Y0n).
The low-level KGC also maintains n member lists ML1, ..., MLn and revo-
cation lists RL1, ..., RLn corresponding to the n MEKs, respectively. To deal
with the revocation problem more efficiently, similarly to our basic system,
a low-level KGC chooses a threshold τ . If a vehicle Vi is compromised (we
assume the member key of Vi is issued by using the j-th MEK, 1 ≤ j ≤ n)
and the number of vehicles in RLj is not greater than τ , the low-level KGC
first finds the revocation token of Vi in MLj, then adds the revocation token
to RLj. Otherwise, the KGC updates its j-th MEK and corresponding public
key u3j and Y0j = ê(u0, u3j), and re-issues member keys for all the vehicles
in j-th sub-group.
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7.5 Summary
We have proposed a new location based service protocol that efficiently ad-
dresses the security and conditional privacy challenges inherent to offering
LBSs in VANETs. In our system, both RSUs and LBS providers are identity-
based, and a vehicle only needs a member key. With its member key, a
vehicle can generate group signatures with verifier-local revocation. Those
signatures can be validated by the LBS providers without violating the pri-
vacy of the vehicles. Furthermore, if an LBS request is found to be false, the
key generation center can determine the identity of the vehicle. Our analysis
shows that the security and privacy mechanisms proposed represent little
extra overhead in a VANET, so that our scheme is a practical one.
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In this thesis, we have focused on providing security and privacy in VANETs.
Several protocols were proposed to secure vehicular communications. Our
first protocol (Chapter 4) is designed for mature VANETs, in which the
RSUs are densely distributed. The second protocol (Chapter 5) is devised
for VANETs in an early deployment stage, i.e. with few available RSUs, and
it aims to process emergency announcements as soon as possible. The two
protocols in Chapter 6 concentrate on signature aggregation/compression
in VANETs, by noting that signatures might have to be stored for a long
period for possible liability investigation. Our last protocol deals with value-
added services in VANETs, and specifically it focuses on providing secure
and privacy-preserving LBSs in vehicular networks.
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Some questions stay open for future research. One problem in the schemes
for signature aggregation/compression in Chapter 6, in the PKI setting, is
how to compress the public keys which have to be stored in the receiving
vehicles; in the ID-based scenario, a problem is how to shorten VOA’s public
key, whose length is currently linear in the VANET size. Addressing these
issues and improving the aggregate signatures will be very interesting to ex-
tensively deploy cryptographic authentication techniques in VANETs. The
group signature schemes we used in our protocols all have a substantial sig-
nature length. They will cause heavy communication overhead for message
relay and an expensive storage load for the purpose of supporting accident
investigation. Therefore, designing short (especially aggregatable) group sig-
nature schemes which support fast batch verification is also regarded as a
future challenge.
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